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Of Mines and Men: Toward a Foundational Theory of the 
Rise, Evolution and Decay of Property 
Guillermo Arribas Irazola† 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why and how is property created? Through a historical analysis, this 
paper proposes that property is created not out of ideology, but by 
chance. Depending on the resources encountered by newcomers, a rising 
civilization will establish property through a centralized controlling gov-
ernment (a top-down system) or through people’s recognized possession 
(a bottom-up or Lockean system). In the former, the government will 
create and allocate property at its own discretion, while in the latter, the 
government will recognize and provide protection for the property of 
individuals.  
 
When the Spaniards conquered Peru in the 1528, they found immense 
amounts of gold and silver. Years later, when the British came to North 
America, they found ice and empty land. The search for bullion by the 
empires pushed the Spanish Crown to implement a top-down property 
regime over its colonies, in order to protect and exclude any third party 
from its resources. A disappointed British Crown, however, permitted 
colonizers to maintain more autonomy and to establish a livelihood for 
themselves in the new land, creating a bottom-up property regime. Out of 
these fortunes, two distinct societies were born, and with each, values 
that created long-standing biases. After centuries, these property regimes 
evolve and yield idiosyncratic social conflicts, causing property systems 
to decay.  
                                                
† Mr. Arribas graduated from Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru School of Law in 2013, 
and is a LL.M. candidate at Yale Law School. Before attending Yale, Mr. Arribas was a law profes-
sor at Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru, where he taught Property, Contracts and Legal 
Skills. Mr. Arribas wishes to thank Carol Rose, Christine Jolls, Claire Priest, and Steven Pincus for 
their generous contributions to earlier versions of this paper and for their valued support; Daniel 
Markovits with the Yale Law School Graduate Program; all the participants of the Work in Progress 
workshop organized by the Graduate Program for their valuable comments;  and Micaela Bullard, 
Isabella Uria, and Bradley Hayes for their constant support reviewing earlier versions of this paper. 
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Studying three Peruvian mining projects (Tambo Grande [1999], Conga 
[2011] and Tia Maria [2015]) canceled due to social conflicts, this pa-
per approaches how an implemented property regime may evolve and 
decay. Using behavioral law and economics and property theory ap-
proaches, this paper proposes to redesign the system and reconcile the 
parties in conflict by giving rural communities the right to decide about 
their immediate environment. This paper attempts to provide an ana-
logue for dealing with conflicts in other jurisdictions (such as opposition 
of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe to the construction of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline in North Dakota). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nélida lives far away in a place surrounded by mountains. She 
and her community have worked the land for many generations. Close to 
their town, there are four lakes; they use the water for drinking and agri-
culture. One day a group of strangers come to Nélida’s town. Some do 
not even speak Nélida’s language. These foreigners have come to meet 
the mayor. After a few hours, the whole town knows that the newcomers 
represent a mining company looking to exploit a mine near the town. The 
rumors spread—mountains of gold lay under the nearby soil. 
Some are excited by the gold, while the mine scares others. They 
have heard suspicious stories about mines. Some believe the gold will 
bring prosperity and opportunities; others think it will bring despair and 
tragedy. Some even begin diving in the lakes and wandering around the 
countryside looking for gold. 
Months go by, and not much happens. The strangers have come 
a couple of times, but overall everything is the same. Some people talked 
about some consultation that happened because of the mine; however, 
not many are aware of it. Some say that they see the strangers more often 
in the areas near the lakes, but that they do not bother anybody.  
Years later, the strangers came to the town again; they have 
found the gold and now they want to take it. The strangers explain that 
they have all the corresponding authorizations from the government. 
They explain that they own the land needed for the project and that the 
government accepted their plan for exploiting it. They tell Nélida and her 
people that a percentage of what is produced from the mine will go to 
their town’s county. They assure them that nothing will happen to them 
or to their land; the only change will be new neighbors from the mine. 
The strangers say they might use water from the lakes, but assure the 
townsfolk that there will always be enough water for all. 
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After the representatives of the mine leave town, their words are 
repeated at every door: the mine will share the bounty. In the following 
days more foreigners come- more that don’t speak Nélida’s language. 
They say that they are an environmental association and have come to 
help the townspeople against the mining company. When the villagers 
tell them about the reward they will receive from the mining company, 
the newcomers answer that the company is lying; that it will take their 
lakes and their land, that nothing will be the same. 
After the representatives of the environmental association walk 
out of town, confusion flooded the streets. Who is lying? Nélida and all 
the members of the town gather to talk about what has happened. They 
like the idea of taking a percentage of the gold, but they want to maintain 
their livelihoods. They want to keep raising their crops and breeding their 
animals.  
At the mining company’s next visit, the villagers tell them what 
the environmental association said. The representatives of the company 
answer that the environmental association was exaggerating, that nothing 
would happen. When the villagers ask for explanations, the representa-
tives cut the conversation off, saying that they do not have the answers 
yet.   
After talking it through, the town decides against the construc-
tion of the mine, but the mine is getting closer to the lakes. Machinery is 
brought in, and with it more people who don’t speak Nélida’s language. 
The mining company stops answering calls and instead starts working. 
Nélida and the townspeople, wanting to protect their lakes, go on 
strike. They occupy the lakes to deter further encroachment from the 
mining company. The police come, the mining company comes, the en-
vironmental association comes, and the media comes. The fight begins.  
Nélida’s story is captured in the documentary, “Daughter of the 
Lake” (“Hija de la Laguna”), which narrates the conflict between the 
Yanacocha mining company and the people of Cajamarca, a province in 
the Andean highlands of Peru, over the extraction of what would have 
been the biggest gold mine in Peru.1 The Conga mining project never 
came to be. Following bloody encounters, the rural communities blocked 
the endeavor in 2012.  
Conga is not an unusual story, not in Peru or in the rest of the 
world. The clash of rural communities with market forces yields different 
outcomes and manifests in different ways. Nélida’s town grappled with 
the effect of a mining company’s activity on the land’s life-sustaining 
                                                
1 This recounting of facts does not try to summarize the story told in “The Daughter of the 
Lake”, nor the testimony given by Nélida itself. This narration attempts impartiality by providing a 
perspective on the conflict itself, based in the documentary, the news of the time, and my personal 
perception living in Lima, Peru, at that time.   
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lakes. More recently, the Standing Rock Sioux tribe2 has resisted the 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline in North Dakota, United 
States, to protect the lands, considered sacred by the tribe that will be 
affected by the pipeline. Some clashes occur not over lands or goods, but 
over ideas. That is the case of some Australian aboriginals, whose culture 
emphasizes communal sharing of belongings. They claim that successful 
artworks produced by one of their members belong to the community.3 
The underlying questions in these cases are “who owns what?” 
and “what protection do the owners have?” As can be easily guessed, we 
are not only talking about traditional property rights over land, but enti-
tlements that appear in the most diverse and unexpected places.  
This discussion is not new. It is possible to trace the debate to the 
beginning of the Peruvian society, as we know it today: the Spanish con-
quest. From the moment that Francisco Pizarro landed on Peruvian soil 
in 15284 and proclaimed all lands, mines, and Indians as property of the 
Spanish crown, history unfurled towards today’s mining conflicts. The 
Spaniards made the procurement of bullion the central economic activity 
in the new land, and mining has remained central in Peruvian society 
ever since. Peru is the second highest producer of silver in the world,5 
possessing the greatest reserves of this metal,6 the third greatest in cop-
per,7 and the sixth greatest in gold.8   
History did not only establish mining as the preferred economic 
activity in the Peruvian case, but also created a long-lasting top-down 
property regime. When the Spaniards conquered Peru in the 1528, they 
found immense amounts of gold and silver. Years later, when the British 
came to North America, they found ice and lots of empty land. The 
search of bullion from the empires pushed the Spanish Crown to imple-
ment a top-down property regime over its colonies, to protect and ex-
clude any third party. In exchange, a disappointed British Crown left the 
colonizers to find their way, creating a bottom-up property regime. This 
accident built societies on each side, creating long standing biases. After 
centuries, social conflicts between the different stakeholders may make 
these property systems decay, as the case of Conga and other mining 
conflicts may suggest. 
                                                
2 Stand With Standing Rock, STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, http://standwithstandingrock.net/ 
(last visited 12/22/2016). 
3 See Carol Rose, Property in Wrong Places, 114 YALE L.J. 992, 993-994 (2005). 
4 HOWARD ERLICHMAN, CONQUEST, TRIBUTE, AND TRADE, 156 (2010). 
5 Rhona O’Connell et al., World Silver Survey 2016 26 (2016). 
6 SNMPE: países con mayores reservas de plata en el mundo. ¿Y Perú?, PERU.COM, 
http://peru.com/actualidad/economia-y-finanzas/snmpe-paises-mayores-reservas-plata-mundo-y-
peru-noticia-451986-1419687 (last visited 12/22/2016). 
7 Mark Brininstool, Copper, 54-55, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITIES 
SUMMARIES (2016). 
8 World Gold Production by Country, USA GOLD (2016). 
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Studying three Peruvian mining projects (Tambo Grande [1999], 
Conga [2011] and Tia Maria [2015]) canceled due to social conflicts, this 
paper approaches how an implemented property regime may evolve and 
decay. Using behavioral law and economics, and property theory, this 
paper proposes to redesign the legal system, giving rural communities 
the right to decide about their immediate environment. The former hav-
ing as an ultimate goal to reconcile the parties. 
Part I presents the three mining conflicts that will be used as cas-
es of study: Tambo Grande (1999), Conga (2011) and Tía María (2015). 
As was the case in the Conga Project, Tambo Grande and Tía María, are 
confrontations are between the villagers on one side and the correspond-
ing mining company, the government, and part of the urban society on 
the other. In this section, we will describe in detail the parties on either 
side (who are labeled “rural communities” and “urban citizens”), and 
identify the goods subject to the conflict (land, and what we will define 
as the “environmental asset”). We will also describe the perceptions of 
both groups in relation to the mining projects. On one side, the urban 
citizens will favor mining endeavors and ignore the rural communities. 
On the other, rural communities will distrust the urban citizens and the 
effects of mining. 
Part II presents the corresponding historical analysis, proving 
that what the Spaniards encountered in Peru created a top-down property 
regime, in contrast to what happened with the British colonies in North 
America. We will draw a transversal line through the centuries in an at-
tempt to arrive at Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María. This section 
also demonstrates how the historical background has nursed the percep-
tions of both parties regarding mining, pitching them towards the con-
flict.   
Part III analyzes the patterns that emerge from the interaction of 
the rural communities and the urban citizens related to mining through 
the prism of behavioral law and economics, in an attempt to understand 
what was behind these similar outcomes. Concretely, we will see how 
the patterns can be explained through judgment (heuristic representative-
ness and availability) and decision making (status quo and endowment 
effect) bounded rationality biases.  
Part IV examines the conflict using an entitlement structure, an-
swering the questions of who owns what and what is the protection rule, 
questions that permeate these conflicts. Viewing the environmental asset 
as a public good (e.g. the lakes in the Conga case), most of the conflicts 
can be examined as arising from the disposition of that good (e.g. the 
decision of whether or not to debase the lakes in the Conga case). Even 
though the rural communities were protected by a liability rule in case of 
harm to the environment, they preferred striking to risking incurring 
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damages, blocking the mining projects in all three cases. The rural com-
munities did not have any legal grounds to oppose or modify these pro-
jects. Regardless, the legal rights of the mining companies and the Peru-
vian government clashed, and lost against the extralegal rights of the ru-
ral communities. 
Finally, in Part V this paper proposes a solution to the conflict: 
to give rural communities the right to decide about their environmental 
asset. Using the language of Calabresi and Melamed,9 this article propos-
es to protect rural communities’ environmental interests by replacing the 
current liability rule with a property rule. Under this structure, the urban 
citizens must convince the rural communities of the benefits the mining 
project will give them. Because the rural communities would have a 
property rule instead of a liability rule, they would not need to strike to 
prevent the mining project from exploiting the environmental asset. Giv-
en that urban citizens maintain decision-making power in this matter, it is 
important that they consider the historical patterns that have been mani-
fest throughout Peru’s nationhood, as well as the behavioral biases that 
sustain these patterns.  
What is currently solved through fighting and bloodshed may 
then be solved through negotiation and words. This proposal attempts to 
reconcile the conflict through agreement, internalizing the externalities 
that have surrounded the mining conflict for centuries. 
I. MINING CONFLICT CASES: TAMBO GRANDE, CONGA AND TÍA MARÍA 
There are currently forty-six potential future mining projects to 
be executed in Peru. The total amount of investment in these projects is 
$45.6 billion. Out of the forty-six projects, twelve involve social con-
flicts.10 Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María, however, are the land-
mark cases in the Peruvian mining social conflicts. In these three cases, 
the rural communities managed to block the projects through protests. 
The following is an account of each of these projects in chronological 
order: 
A. Project Tambo Grande 
Manhattan Minerals, a Canadian company, obtained a mining 
concession to extract gold, silver and zinc in Tambo Grande, a town in 
                                                
9 Guido Calabresi, A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092-1093 (1972). 
10 Jorge Falen, Doce de 46 proyectos mineros enfrentan conflictos sociales, EL COMMERCIO, 
(Dec. 6, 2016) http://elcomercio.pe/sociedad/peru/doce-46-proyectos-mineros-enfrentan-conflictos-
sociales-noticia-1944584.. 
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northern Peru. The mining project provided an investment of $405 mil-
lion in a town where the people earn on average $2 per day.11 
In order to carry out the project, Manhattan Minerals needed to 
relocate twenty-five thousand villagers because the minerals lay under-
neath the town. The displacement of the people of Tambo Grande also 
implied a change in their economic activity, because within the range of 
the mining project was also the land where the inhabitants grew mangos 
and limes.    
From 1999 to 2005, many strikes took place in Tambo Grande. 
The people demonstrated frequently, in one instance burning down the 
Manhattan mining camp. In 2002, a nonbinding referendum was held to 
test whether the citizens of Tambo Grande wanted the mining. The 
townspeople rejected the mining project with more than 93 percent of the 
votes.  
In 2005, Manhattan Minerals declared the termination of the pro-
ject after investing approximately $60 million in it. Carlos del Solar, then 
the president of the National Society of Mining, Oil and Energy, quali-
fied this event as “regrettable,” hoping that the situation would not be 
repeated.12 Tambo Grande never began operation.  
B. Project Conga 
Yanacocha, a company with American and Peruvian capital, 
wanted to mine gold in the province of Cajamarca. The project involved 
an investment of $5 billion in a region in which 50 percent of the popula-
tion lived below the poverty line.13 
The project required draining four lakes in order extract the min-
erals that were partially located underneath them. After investing $1.5 
billion, on November 16, 2011, the people of Cajamarca took to the 
streets against Conga, chanting, “you can’t drink gold.” The Peruvian 
government declared a state of emergency in the area on two occasions, 
first on December 5, 2011, and again on July 4, 2012.  
                                                
11 Tambogrande: Mangos, Muerte, Mineria, (Guarango Film & Video 2011) 
https://vimeo.com/14075010.  
12 Minera Manhattan desiste de explotar Tambogrande y anuncia retiro del Perú, LA 
REPÚBLICA, http://larepublica.pe/09-02-2005/minera-manhattan-desiste-de-explotar-tambogrande-y-
anuncia-retiro-del-peru (last visited 12/22/2017). 
13 Inversión minera en Cajamarca cayó 55% durante el 2013. EL COMERCIO (March 21, 2014). 
http://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/inversion-minera-cajamarca-cayo-55-durante-2013-noticia-
1717472; Editorial: La Conga electoral. EL COMERCIO. (Oct. 8, 2014). 
http://elcomercio.pe/opinion/editorial/editorial-conga-electoral-noticia-1761949; Editorial: 
Liderazgo de Plaza. EL COMERCIO. (March 08, 2016). 
http://elcomercio.pe/opinion/editorial/editorial-liderazgo-plaza-noticia-1884615; and Falta de 
decisión del Gobierno paralizó Conga. DIARIO CORREO. (May 2, 2016) 
http://diariocorreo.pe/economia/falta-de-decision-del-gobierno-paralizo-conga-669833/.For further 
reference please see: http://elcomercio.pe/noticias/proyecto-conga-322786. 
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Even though the mining companies offered to build reservoirs to 
replace the lakes, which, according to an international expert, would pro-
vide the communities with better water, the parties were unable to reach 
an agreement and the Conga project was never executed.   
C. Project Tía María 
Southern Copper Corporation, an American company with Mex-
ican capital, obtained a mining concession from the Peruvian Govern-
ment to extract copper in the province of Islay (a small town in Arequipa 
in southern Peru). The project involved an investment of $1.4 billion, the 
creation of over three thousand new jobs, and a 7.7 percent increase in 
Arequipa’s gross annual income.14 
The project needed to relocate part of the city of Islay. After in-
vesting more than $348 million,15 on the March 23, 2015, the community 
of Islay went on strike to protest Tía María. The strike resulted in more 
than one hundred casualties among both strikes and the Peruvian police. 
On May 22, 2015, the Peruvian Government declared a state of emer-
gency in Islay. Tía María was never executed.    
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María all involve the same de-
bate. The villagers believed that they had the right to decide if the mining 
projects were to be executed or not. Their protests were attempts to ex-
clude the mining companies from their land and environment.  
Land is typically a private good, and environment a public one. 
Only the owners of the land can enjoy it, while all are entitled to enjoy 
the environment. However, in this case “environment” has a special defi-
nition, because damaging it directly affects a specific group of people- 
the rural communities. In Tambo Grande and Tía María, the pollution of 
the ground would harm villagers of the valleys who planted limes, man-
gos, and rice. In the case of Conga, draining the lakes would affect the 
villagers who used the lakes for irrigation and drinking water. For this 
reason, this paper adopts a malleable definition of environment, terming 
it the “environmental asset.” Affecting the environmental asset implies 
any change in the way of life of a specific community. 
                                                
14 Southern Copper tendrá lista Tía María en 2017 tras luz verde, EL COMERCIO, (Jan. 22, 
2015). http://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/southern-copper-tendra-lista-tia-maria-2017-luz-verde-
noticia-1786447; Conflicto por Tía María amenaza economía del Valle de Tambo, EL COMERCIO, 
(May 21, 2015). http://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/conflicto-tia-maria-amenaza-economia-valle-
tambo-noticia-1812758, Tía María: Southern confirma que no retomará proyecto en julio, EL 
COMERCIO, (Jun. 26, 2015). http://elcomercio.pe/politica/actualidad/tia-maria-southern-confirma-
que-no-retomara-proyecto-julio-noticia-1821750. For further reference please see: 
http://elcomercio.pe/noticias/proyecto-tia-maria-132053 . 
15 ¿Cuanto pierde Arequipa por salida de Tía María?, DIARIO CORREO, 
http://diariocorreo.pe/economia/cuanto-pierte-arequipa-por-salida-de-tia-maria-575402/ (last visited 
12/22/2016). 
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Now, who are the parties fighting over the land and the environ-
mental asset? There are many involved in these social conflicts. In our 
simplistic narration of Nélida’s story we find the villagers, the mining 
company, the media, public opinion, the environmental associations, and 
the government, all in important roles. The principal parties for the pur-
poses of our analysis, however, are the villagers from the rural communi-
ties on one side, and the government, the mining companies and some 
parts of the urban citizenry who support mining extraction on the other.  
The group labeled as “rural communities” includes Peruvians 
who are not accustomed to the institutions that often characterize devel-
oped western world economies. Most of this group will not have access 
to credit, and depend on a subsistence or informal economy. Many mem-
bers of this group work in agriculture and live in small towns, but these 
are not essential characteristics. There may be cases of rural communities 
that do very little commerce or that live in poverty on the margins of 
populous cities. 
The group labeled as “urban citizens” includes Peruvians who 
participate actively in the international economic system, reflecting typi-
cal habits of a developed western economy. They are part of the market, 
either as producers, consumers or politicians. This group is specially 
concentrated in the principal cities on the coast of Peru, but living in a 
city is not an essential characteristic. The traditional members of this 
group are related to the former Spanish or European elites, as will be ex-
plained in the next section, but today many people of indigenous ancestry 
have joined this group as well. Within this group, then, we include gen-
erally the mining companies, the government and the developed urban 
society.   
The negotiation and implementation of Tambo Grande, Conga 
and Tía María was considerably handicapped by preconceived perspec-
tives on both sides of the table, which we will analyze in the following 
sections. Even though one can identify many more tendencies from these 
cases, this paper will focus in the following perspectives:  
  
• A tendency of urban citizens to consider irrational the negative 
attitudes of the rural communities towards mining projects that 
are planned within, or close to, their domains. 
• A tendency of the rural communities to distrust the offers made 
by the urban citizens related to the mining projects.  
• A tendency of rural communities to consider that a mining pro-
ject may result in an environmental disaster, which would 
change or destroy their way of living.  
• A preference from the Peruvian urban citizens to promote min-
ing as the most valuable source of economic income.  
2017] Of Mines and Men 11 
• A resistance from rural communities to allow or transfer entitle-
ments to the mining companies so they can execute their pro-
jects, preferring to preserve their current way of living. 
 
It is important to note that this does not mean that all the mem-
bers of what we have called the rural communities and the urban citizens 
are going to be affected by these perspectives. There are members of the 
rural communities that support the mining projects, and members of the 
urban citizens that support the rural communities. As a clear example we 
have the environmental associations that are principally comprised of 
urban citizens. However, it seems that these perspectives are preponder-
ant in a significant number of members of these groups, causing what 
happened in Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María.   
In this paradigm it is important to mention that even though 
members of rural communities have come to the cities, it is harder to find 
the same phenomenon in the opposite direction. The majority of people 
who live in rural communities are native descendants. This reality quite 
often creates a perception of “otherness” from the traditional urban citi-
zens with regards to the rural communities, intensifying the above-
mentioned perspectives and the sense of inequality between these two 
groups. As we will see in the following section, this dynamic has been 
present in Peru since the Spanish conquest.  
II. PARTIES’ PERSPECTIVES THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
When the Spanish conquered Peru in the 1500s, they “acquired” 
all the land, mines and Indians from the moment they stepped down from 
their ships in the recently discovered New World. Even though the Span-
ish fought the Indians to gain control afterwards, they believed all along 
that they were fighting to protect their rights, rather than trying to obtain 
them.  
In this section we will review the effects in Peruvian history of 
the acquisition of land, mines and Indians by the Spaniards. As we will 
see, this created a peculiar relation between the Spaniards and the Indians 
that was later to become the dynamic between the elites and the Indians 
in the independent republic of Peru, or, in other terms, between the rural 
communities and the urban citizens. This relationship, as later explained, 
is the root of the patterns mentioned in Section I above, which affected 
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María. Also, we will see how this back-
ground shaped the creation of a top-down property regime in the Peruvi-
an colonies, which still has a place in the Peruvian system today.  
Through this explanation we may draw parallels with other civi-
lizations, especially between the British Empire and its North American 
12 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 7:1 
colonies, to comprehend through contrast the importance of the historical 
component in the mining conflict.    
A. Land Acquisition  
In 1528, Francisco Pizarro landed on the shore of Peru, close to 
what today would be the beach of Colán. The conqueror jumped onto the 
sand and declared the discovered land as part of the Spanish Empire’s 
domain.16 Why was he entitled to do so? Because the Spanish crown had 
a special authorization from Pope Alejandro VI. Fernando and Isabel, the 
Catholic King and Queen of Spain, requested authorization from the 
pope to occupy and acquire the new lands discovered in America. The 
pope issued the corresponding Bula on May 4, 1493, authorizing the 
Spaniards to go spread the Catholic faith to the Americas and, while do-
ing so, acquire all the land that they would discover. The pope said spe-
cifically in the Bula that the Catholic Church “donated” the land in favor 
of the Spanish empire.17  
The Spanish recognition and interpretation of the Bula is to be 
found in the “Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias” (here 
after, “Recopilación de Indias”), which included all the laws enacted by 
the Spanish monarchs in their colonies since the beginning of the con-
quest. Published for the first time in 1681 by King Carlos II,18 the Recop-
ilación acknowledges the new discoveries as property of the Spanish 
crown “Por donación de la Santa Sede Apostólica.”19 According to the 
                                                
16 Erlichman, supra note 4, at 156. 
17 Bula del Papa Alejandro VI en favor de los reyes de España, in LAS INSTITUCIONES 
JURÍDICAS EN LAS CONQUISTA DE AMÉRICA 215 (Silvio Zavala, ed., 1971) (“con declaración, que 
por esta nuestra donación, concesión, y asignación no se entienda, ni se pueda entender que se quite, 
ni haya de quitar el derecho adquirido a ningún príncipe Christiano, que actualmente huviere poseído 
las dichas islas y tierras firmes hasta el susodicho día de Natividad de nuestro señor Jesu-Christo ”. 
In: “Bula del Papa Alejandro VI en favor de los reyes de España”); It is important to note that this 
Bula was issued one year before the Treaty of Tordesillas. The Treaty of Tordesillas was signed by 
the Kings of Spain, Portugal and the Pope Alejandro VI on June 1494. The Treaty of Tordesille was 
the basis for what was later consider the “Discovery Doctrine”, which recognized the sovereignty 
that the European nations would have over the new discovered land. This doctrine is latter on adopt-
ed by the United States Supreme Court in the case Johnson v. M’Instosh (1823), after more than 300 
years.  See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency, 148 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1065, 1065-1189 (2000).  
Therefore, the pope endorsement was essential to the Spanish conquest in America.  
18 Even though the Recopilacion de Indias was published in 1681, the Laws that this recompila-
tion contained were enacted in many cases since the beginning of the viceroyalty. The Recopilacion 
de Indias didn’t create new Laws, but collect all the applicable Laws to the Spanish Empire colonies 
instead.   
19 1 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 523 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Por donacion de la Santa Sede Apostolica y otros justos y legitimos titulos, somos senor de las 
Indias Occidentales, Islas, y Tierra firme del Mar Oceano, descubiertas, y por descibrir, y estan 
incorporadas en nuestra Real Corona de Castilla. Y porque es nuestra voluntad, y lo hemos 
prometido y jurado, que siempre permanezcan unidas para su mayor perpetuidad y firmeza, 
prohibimos la enagenacion de ellas”).  
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Bula, the Recopilación de Indias also established the spread of the Catho-
lic word to the New World as the principal goal of the conquest.20  
Juan de Solorzano, one of the compilers of the Recopilación de 
Indias, wrote a book named Politica Indiana in 1647, commenting on 
what was to be published in the Recopilación de Indias.21 There, Solor-
zano explains that the correct interpretation of the recompilation in-
volved the acquisition of property rights over the land to be discovered.22 
The question underlying these statements, however, is whether the pope 
had the power and jurisdiction to transfer property rights over land occu-
pied by the Indians in America.23 As explained, the stated intention be-
hind the pope’s grant was the spread of Catholicism. At this point in his-
tory, to teach the Indians the Catholic word was equivalent to saving 
their souls. The mission of the Church was to expand the Gospel as far as 
possible, to save as many souls as it could.  
Notwithstanding this romantic perspective, from the most rudi-
mentary legal standard it is obvious that the pope did not have the power 
to transfer the land of the New World to Spain, especially considering 
that the natives already held the territory. This donation was not enforce-
able against the Inca Empire because the pope did not have jurisdiction 
over their land, their property, or the people themselves. The Bula was an 
endorsement for the Spanish crown to conquer America. The Bula al-
lowed the conquerors to use force to “protect” their rights, rather than 
using it to gain new rights. 
As one can imagine, when Pizarro came to Peru and declared 
that the kings in some distant fatherland were the owners of all the Inca 
Empire, war became a reality. The Spanish conquerors, in Peru with 
Francisco Pizarro and in Mexico with Hernán Cortes, didn’t bargain for 
the land, they took it by sword just as their government had authorized 
them to do. Moreover, they had the best justification, for they acted not 
in the name of men, but in the name of God.  
After the conquerors “pacified”” an area, they would split it up 
into concessions for the Spaniards who would remain in the locality. The 
                                                
20 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 1 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Porque el fin principal, que nos mueve a hacer nuevos descubrimientos es la predicacion, y 
dilatacion de la Santa Fe Catolica , y que los Indios sean ensenados , y vivan en paz y policia”).  
21 As the reader may notice, Politica Indiana was published 34 years before the Recopilacion de 
Indias. Moreover, the Recopilacion de Indias was even published after the death of both of its au-
thors (Antonio de León Pinelo, 1660 and Juan de Solorzano, 1655). This can be explained because, 
first, the compilation was a collection of all the applicable Laws in the Spanish colonies, thus, such 
laws existed before the Recopilacion de Indias was published. Second, in order to publish the Recop-
ilacion de Indias, it was necessary the political approval of the King and the printing of the Recop-
ilacion de Indias, this may had created a delay that exceeded both of the authors lives.     
22 JUAN SOLORZANO, POLÍTICA INDIANA 139 (Fundación Jose Antonio de Castro 1971) (1647); 
See also Zavala, supra note 17, at 30. 
23 But see Zavala, supra note 17, at 15-29; ANTONIO MURO, LECCIONES DE HISTORIA DEL 
DERECHO HISPANO – INDIANO 31-45 (1989). 
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Recopilación de Indias mandated this as an incentive for newcomers to 
keep expanding the Spanish empire.24  
It is true that the Spanish spread the Catholic word in the Ameri-
cas. John Blanco recounts one of the chronicles of Bernardo Diaz del 
Castillo, one of Cortes’ soldiers, who said that “almost every encounter 
between Cortes’ band and native society concludes with the conquista-
dor’s injunction for the leaders’ ‘idols’ to be smashed, and for an image 
of the virgin Mary to be erected in their place.”25 However, it is undenia-
ble that such spiritual conquest had a political aim all along- the expan-
sion of the Spanish empire and, with it, its economic power.  
This process was very different from the British experience. As 
explained by Stuart Banner, the British colony in North America26 and in 
New Zealand27 respected the ownership of the Indians who occupied the 
land. As Pagden said, the British preferred settlement instead of con-
quest.28  
The British would buy land from the Indians, “conquering” the 
land by contract instead of by sword. This gave the British a much more 
pacific occupation of the land, using force only when necessary.29 In this 
sense, John Locke, criticizing the idea of conquest over settlement, said: 
“Indeed it often makes way for a new frame of a Common Wealth, by 
destroying the former; but without the consent of the people, can never 
erect a new one.”30  
What would have happened if the British had encountered an 
empire like the Aztecs or the Incas instead of less populated land? Would 
their methods have been the same? Probably not. At the beginning of 
imperial expansion, which was around 100 years before John Locke 
                                                
24 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 39 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Porque nuestros vasallos se alienten al descubrimiento y poblacion de las Indias, y puedan vivir 
con la comodidad, y conveniencia , que deseamos: Es nuestra voluntad , que se puedan repartir y 
repartan casas, solares , tierras, caballerias, y peonias a todos los que fueren a poblar tierras nuevas 
en los Pueblos y Lugares (…), les concedemos facultad, para que de alli adelante los puedan vender , 
y hacer de ellos a su voluntad libremente, como cosa suya propia; y asimismo conforme su calidad, 
el Gobernador, o quien tuviere nuestra facultad , les enconiende los Indios en el repartimiento que 
hiciere para que gocen de sus aprovechamientos y demoras, en conformidad de las tasas, y de lo que 
esta' ordenado”).  
25 John Blanco, Our Lady of Anarchy: Iconography as Law on the Frontiers of the Spanish 
Empire, in COLONIALITY, RELIGION, AND THE LAW IN THE EARLY IBERIAN WORLD (HISPANIC 
ISSUES), 243 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press 2014) 
26 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 86 (Aspen Coursebook Series 3rd ed., 2005). 
27 Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zea-
land, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 321-333 (Aspen Coursebook series 3rd ed., 2005). 
28 ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD, 86 (1995). 
29 As will be explained in section 2.3, the British settlement did not cause less harm than the 
Spanish conquest of the Indians. Driven by economic incentives, both cases ended up in mistreat-
ment and mass killing of Indian communities. 
30 Pagden, supra note 28, at 86 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 403 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)). 
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wrote his Two Treatises of Government, all the empires and colonizers 
wanted to follow the path blazed by Spain.31 Only when the other em-
pires noted that there was not another Mexico or Peru to be found did the 
philosophy of the colonization change.32     
Nonetheless, we can see the difference between the acquisition 
of property rights in the British versus the Spanish colonies. The British 
settled and bought the land from the Indians, whilst the Spanish fought in 
name of Christ and acquired all the land by force. The British colonizers 
bought the land for themselves, paying an agreed value (even though 
many times such consideration was derisory), while the Spanish con-
quered the land for the crown, dividing it later between the conquerors as 
concessions. This is of great importance; the conquerors in the Spanish 
colonies didn’t have property rights as did the British colonizers, but in-
stead a grace from the crown. Just as they could receive a grant of land 
by the authorities, the authorities could also take it away. This is a con-
stant in all the rights that were given during the Spanish colonization pe-
riod: property was not absolute.33 
B. Mine Acquisition 
Mining has a special place in this story. The Recopilación de In-
dias itself declared that gold and silver were the “main economic nerve” 
of the Spanish Empire.34 From the beginning of the conquest, the Spanish 
realized that the land in Peru and Mexico (New Spain during the colonial 
period) was rich in minerals. As Francisco Xavier de Gamboa said, New 
Spain had “mountains of gold and silver”35 to offer. The Peruvian case 
was even greater; at the time people would say, “the world revolved 
around the two economic poles of Potosi and Huancavelica.”36 Potosí 
with its silver, and Huancavelica with it is mercury, were consider the 
center of bullion for the world. At this point in history, all empires were 
                                                
31 Pagden, supra note 28, at 67; see also JOHN ELLIOT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD 88 
(2006). 
32 Pagden, supra note 28, at 68. 
33 We can note, however, a common area between the creation of rights in favor of the Spanish 
and British empire, in both cases the empires implemented legal systems that were strange for the 
natives. In the case of the Spanish, they took the land away from the natives, as a generalize expro-
priation of land decided by the central government. In the case of the British, they forced the natives 
into a western Lockean view of property rights, based on who had control over the goods. Though 
the Spanish spilled more blood, both measures where impositions. 
34 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 493 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Ordenamos y mandamos a los Vireyes, Presidentes , y Gobernadores, que tengan mucha cuenta, y 
cuiden con especial atencion del beneficio, y labor de las minas descubiertas , y procuren aplicar 
toda su diligencia en que se busquen , descubran, y labren otras nuevas, porque la riqueza, y 
abundancia de plata, y oro es el nervio principal , de que resulta la de aquellos , y estos Reynos”).  
35 FRANCISCO XAVIER DE GAMBOA, COMENTARIOS A LAS ORDENANZAS DE MINAS Preface 
(1761). 
36 Muro, supra note 23, at 300. 
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eager to find bullion, and Spain had found what seemed to be an inex-
haustible source of it.37 
Equal to the land, the Recopilación de Indias mandated that 
mines were owned by the Crown, but could be exploited by its subjects.38 
This is also recognized by the Peruvian Ordenanzas the Minas39 and the 
New Spain Ordenanzas de Minas.40 
The Spanish Crown would receive in exchange from its subjects 
el Quinto of all the production of the mines, being a tax of twenty per-
cent over the obtained minerals according to the Recopilación de Indi-
as.41 Because all the minerals that were taken from the ores had to be 
marked with the Quinto before it was traded,42 it was easier to get paid 
for such tax. El Quinto was paid without taking into account the actual 
costs of extracting the mineral, so it equated to twenty percent of the 
gross income of the miners. 
The comparison with the British colonies in North America is 
quite simple in this case, because they did not find equivalent mineral 
sources. This would later compel the British to change their perspective 
toward the economic activities of their colonies.   
                                                
37 Elliot, supra note 31, at 88. 
38 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 68 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) (“Es 
nuestra merced y voluntad, que todas las personas, de qualquier estado , condicion, preeminencia , a' 
dignidad , Espanoles , e Indios , nuestros vasallos, puedan sacar oro, plata, azogue, y otros metales 
por sus personas, criados , o esclavos en todas las minas, que hallaren, o donde quisieren, y por bien 
tuvieren, y los coger, y labrar libremente sin ningun genero de impedimento, habiendo dado cuenta 
al Gobernador , y Oficiales Reales para el efecto contenido en la ley siguiente, por manera, que las 
minas de oro, plata, y los demnas metales sean comunes a todos , y en todas partes, y terninos , con 
que no resulte perjuicio a los Indios , ni a otro tercero ni esta permision se extienda a los Ministros, 
Gobernadores , Corregidores , Alcaldes mayores , y sus Tenientes Letrados, Alcaldes , y Escribanos 
de minas , ni a los que tuvieren especial prohibicion : y cerca de senalar, tomar las minas , y 
estacarse en ellas, se guarden las leyes , y ordenanzas hechas en cada Provincia, siendo por Nos 
confirmadas”).  
39 DE NAVARRA MELCHOR, DE LAS ORDENANZAS DEL PERÚ 224 (1752) (“Primeramente, por 
quanto los minerales son propios de la Magestad, y derechos realengos por leyes, y costumbres, así 
los da, y concede a sus vasallos, y súbditos donde quiera que los descubrieren).”  
40 See REALES ORDENANZAS PARA LA DIRECCIÓN, RÉGIMEN Y GOBIERNO DEL IMPORTANTE 
CUERPO DE LA MINERÍA DE NUEVA ESPAÑA, Y DE SU REAL TRIBUNAL GENERAL Art. 1-3 (1783). 
41 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 480 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Mandamos que todos los vecinos, y moradores de nuestras Indias, que cogieren, o sacaren en 
qualquier Provincia, o parte de ellas , oro, plata , plomo , estano, azogue , hierro, u otro qualquier 
metal, nos hayan de pagar , y paguen la quinta parte de lo que cogieren, o sacaren neto, sin otro 
ningun descuento”).  
42 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 93 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Prohibimos y defendemos a todos universalmente, de qualquier estado , o condicion, que puedan 
vender, tomar , prestar , empenar , ni en otra forma contratar en oro en polvo, ni tejuelos , ni otro 
ninguno que no este fundido, ensayado, y quintado, pena de perderlo, aplicado por tercias partes, las 
dos a nuestra Camara y Fisco , y la otra al Denunciador. Y mandamos a los Vireyes , y Audiencias, 
que ordenen como mejor puedan, y mas convenga, que la misma prohibicion se guarde con los 
Indios”).  
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C. Labor Acquisition 
In order to complete the economic cycle, the Spanish empire 
needed labor to exploit the mines, and they found it: the Peruvian and 
Mexican viceroyalties had as many Indians as minerals in the ground.43 
Once again, religion became the principal excuse to use the 
sword, pacify the natives, and teach them the word of God. To this ex-
tent, the Recopiliación de Indias indicated that the corresponding Spanish 
authorities in each locality would give a number of natives to the con-
querors that were to stay on their land,44 and keep a registry of it.45 This 
system was called encomiendas, which means “custody”. The Spaniards 
who received Indians were supposed to teach them the word of God and 
take care of them. In exchange, the Indians were to work for the Spanish. 
Even though the written position of the Spanish Empire in the 
Recopilación de Indias was to protect the natives of the New World,46 
reality overcame such intentions. The pressure to obtain bullion, united 
with the temptation of using the thousands of Indians at hand, naturally 
concluded in systematic exploitation. As Elliot says, “… [encomienda] 
which was supposed to carry with it certain spiritual and moral obliga-
tions…was liable to be no more than a license to oppress and exploit.”47 
As de Solorzano recounted in his Politica Indiana, the crown 
even abolished the encomienda in 1542, but was urged to reenact it in 
1547 due to economic need.48 The Crown, in its pursuit of not enslaving 
                                                
43 See VINCENT GAY, LEYES DEL IMPERIO ESPAÑOL 25 (1924) (Even though the Spaniards 
brought diseases to their colonies which killed many natives, as shown by Vincent Gay, the amount 
of natives was kept as an important amount throughout time). 
44 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 249 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Luego que se haya hecho la pacificacion, y sean los naturales reducidos a nuestra obediencia , 
como esta ordenado por las leyes, que de esto tratan , el Adelantado , Gobernador , o Pacificador , en 
quien esta facultad resida, reparta los Indios entre los pobladores , para que cada uno se encargue de 
los que fueren de su repartimiento, y los defienda , y ampare, proveyendo Ministro , que les ensene 
la Doctrina Christiana, y administre los Sacramentos , guardando nuestro Patronazgo , y ensene a 
vivir en policia , haciendo lo demas , que esten obligados los Encomenderos en sus repartimientos, 
segun se dispone en las leyes de este libro”. In: “Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las 
Indias”).  
45 1 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 560 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Los Vireyes y Presidentes tengan libro general de todos los repartimientos de Indios, que hubiere 
en sus Provincias , declarando quien los posee , si estan en primera, o segunda vida, el numero de 
Indios , y cantidad de sus tasas, el qual se guarde en el Archivo con los demas papeles del gobierno , 
y en todas ocasiones nos envien relacion firmada de su propia mano de los que han vacado, y las 
personas en que los hubieren encomendado , y por que causas”).  
46 2 RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 189 (Impresora, 4th ed. 1791) 
(“Habiendo de tratar en este libro la materia de Indios , su libertad , aumento, y alivio, como se 
contiene en los titulos de que se ha formado : Es nuestra voluntad encargar a los Vireyes, 
Presidentes, y Audiencias el cuidado de mirar por ellos, y dar las ordenes convenientes, para que 
sean amparados, favorecidos , y sobrellevados…”).  
47 Elliot, supra note 31, at 89. 
48 Solorzano, supra note 22, at 623-631. 
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the Indians, tried to limit their work through the Law,49 but reality made 
the same legal body authorize, and endorse, forced labor in the mines.50 
While reading these passages one can feel a legal schizophrenia, 
but it makes absolute sense when we remember the Crown’s ultimate 
economic goal: bullion. After all, as Antonio Muro said, the Indians were 
“always the most abundant, most acclimated to the varied geography, 
and furthermore, the cheapest.”51 The Spanish empire needed few Afri-
can slaves because of the abundance of Indians.52 People had to pay for 
the slaves, but acquisition of Indians only required that you obtained 
“custody” of them. Furthermore, the Indians were accustomed to the 
height of the mountains where the mines were principally placed. 
Indians could be used to perform any labor, but mining was the 
toughest. Readapting an ancient Inca system of labor called the “mita,”53 
the Indians were forced to work. The Ordenanzas of Peru given by the 
viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1573 recounts the fatalities he found in 
the mines of the viceroyalty of Peru. Among other abuses, Indians 
wouldn’t get paid54 or they weren’t allowed to drink water while they 
were in the mines, dying of thirst.55 Francisco de Gamboa, commented 
that the ordenanzas of the viceroyalty of New Spain encountered similar 
situations.56 According to Howard Erlichman, in reference to mining 
work in the Potosi Mines, “[m]ost of these tasks were performed by Na-
tive Americans and most of these workers eventually succumbed to 
overwork, brutal conditions, and/or diseases.”57 
As can be seen, regardless what the Recopilación de Indias said, 
the Spanish conquerors owned the Indians and their labor. As Peter 
                                                
49 Id. at 188-196. 
50 Id. at 357-409. 
51 Muro, supra note 23, at 292. 
52 Gay, supra note 43, at 25. 
53 See Muro, supra note 51, at 299 (explaining that Mita is an Inca’s word, which can be trans-
lated to “from time to time”. Originally it consisted in temporal work that Indians would perform in 
the mines as to please the Inca. The Spaniards took this institution and used it to exploit the mines 
and, obviously, the Indians also). 
54 1 DE NAVARRA MELCHOR, DE LAS ORDENANZAS DEL PERU 274 (Lima, 1752) (“Y porque 
ceden los fraudes que hasta aquí ha habido en no pagar los jornales a los indios, que se reparten en la 
plaza, como en detenerlos algunos días, y otros en darles menos de lo que está estatuydo, y otros 
llevando más indios de los que han meneste para reservallos, haciéndose sobre esto algunas 
contradicciones ilícitas.”).  
55 Id. at 282 (“Otro si, por quanto una de las cosas más necesarias al sustento humano, es la 
bebida, y en las ordenanzas del señor virrey D. Francisco de Toledo está mandado, que los dueños de 
las dichas minas, y sus mineros sean obligados a tener a las bocas de las minas, y socavones botijas 
de agua suficiente, y las que fueren necesarias para todos los indios que con ellos trabajan, en lo qual 
ha habido notable descuydo, y no solamente no tienen agua, pero los dichos mineros no consienten a 
los dichos indios que vayan por ella.”).  
56 Id.  
57 Erlichman, supra note 4, at 259; See ALLISON BIGUELOW, WOMEN, MEN, AND THE LEGAL 
LANGUAGES OF MINING IN THE COLONIAL ANDES 364 (Ethnohistory 2016) (providing further com-
ments of the mining labor in the mines of Potosi). 
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Bakewell explained, referring to the Ordenanzas de Peru issued by the 
viceroy Toledo, “these rules must have been dead letter from the day 
they were issued.”58 According to Zavala, in order to exploit the New 
World, the Spaniards took the land and the Indians, establishing “domin-
ion over the inhabitants of America.”59 
Did the British do the same to the Natives in North America? 
Not as a general practice.60 The British didn’t find mines to exploit, nor 
did they find enough Natives to make using them worthwhile. One tradi-
tional explanation may be that acting as the Spaniards was against their 
principles, following a Lockean philosophy, but, as explained above, the-
se arguments didn’t exist at the beginning of the colonies when the Brit-
ish thought they could still find a new Peru or Mexico. As Kades ex-
plains, “if it had been cheaper to be more brutal, then Europeans would 
have been more brutal. Such brutality, however, was not cheap at all.”61 
Nonetheless, the British were brutal to the Indians in America, 
but in a different manner than the Spanish were. As explained in section 
2.1, the British conquered principally by contract, buying the Indians’ 
land, whilst the Spanish conquered by sword. The Indians were not 
worth it for the British as they were for the Spanish. Indian communities 
in North America were not as concentrated as in the case of Peru or Mex-
ico, nor were there mines to make the Indians work in. Thus, the British 
built a fence around themselves, leaving the Indians out, while the Span-
iards fenced themselves with the Indians, leaving the Indians in. The 
British got rid of the Indians (buying them out or killing them when they 
did not want to sell their land, or when they did not recognize their pos-
session as property) whilst the Spanish preserved them.  
The Spanish and British colonies both ended up with mass kill-
ing and mistreatment of native Indians, but the means to the result were 
shaped differently. On one hand, many Indians in North America were 
left stagnate after losing their land for undervalued considerations. On 
the other, many Indians in South America were killed by the work in the 
mines. It is hard to say which case caused more harm to the native com-
munities.      
                                                
58 PETER BAKEWELL, MINERS OF THE RED MOUNTAIN 152 (University of New Mexico Press 
1943). 
59 SILVIO ZAVALA, LAS INSTITUCIONES JURIDICAS EN LAS CONQUISTA DE AMERICA 44 
(Editorial Porrua Ciudad de Mexico 1971) 
60 Is known that there were some cases of slaved Indians, but this were in any case exceptions 
of the general rule. See generally Banner, supra note 26. 
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D. Creating a Top-Down Property Structure 
As seen in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, in their colonies the Span-
iards acquired the land, the mines and the Indians themselves in the name 
of God. The British, in contrast, principally acquired land through bar-
gaining. Why do we see this difference? Due to fortune, accidental for-
tune. 
In the 1500s, all empires wanted gold and silver, and the Peruvi-
an and Mexico mines were enormous sources of it. Because Spain had 
the “fortune” of acquiring these mines through random chance, they im-
plemented many measures to protect them. On the other hand, because 
the British and French did not find equivalent sources of precious metals 
in their American colonies, they did not impose strong government 
measures over their colonies at the beginning. As Elliot put it, “the early 
discovery of gold in the Spanish Caribbean introduced an urgency into 
the establishment of some form of state control which was not felt in 
British Atlantic world that seemed to offer little more than fish, furs, 
timber and a few bales of tobacco.”62 
That statement is not only logical, but also the economic basis of 
the creation of property rights.63 When you have a scarce resource and 
you value it highly, then reasonable people are willing to invest in exclu-
sion methods to protect the good. The peculiarity here is that the poten-
tial “owner” was the empires. The application of this rationale to the 
commented scenario translates into the strong government intervention 
of Spain in its colonies from the start and the lack of it from the British 
Empire in theirs. More probable than not, if the British had found Peru or 
Mexico, they would have become Spain. 
This “accident” marked two radically different methods of crea-
tion of property rights. As Carol Rose explained, we can have bottom-up 
or top-down property rights regimes.64 The former supposes the recogni-
tion in the legal system of the control a person has over certain resource 
(a Lockean view of property rights), while the latter has the legal system 
through the state as a creator of property rights, distributing, creating and 
revoking such rights. 
It would seem that the establishment of these different property 
systems turns the rudder of economies in different directions, thereby 
creating a pattern. We can trace a sustained preference for extractive 
economies in Peru, never reaching industrialization, whilst the United 
States became the most powerful industrialized country in the world. 
                                                
62 Elliot, supra note 31, at 113. 
63 Howard Demesetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 
(1967). 
64 CAROL ROSE, WHAT GOVERNMENTS CAN DO FOR PROPERTY (AND VICE VERSA) 210-212 
(Jai Press Inc. 1999). 
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Comparing the development of Spain and Peru to that of Britain and the 
United States, it is easy to realize how important this outcome was. Peru 
and Spain may have been victims of what has been called the “resource 
curse,”65 (a negative relationship between natural resource wealth and 
economic growth). 
During the time of the Peruvian viceroyalties, the Spaniards ex-
ploited the land, mines, and Indians that were available. Because the In-
dians already occupied the land, there was no need for the Spaniards to 
send labor from Europe to Peru. The vast majority of Spaniards who 
came to America worked as supervisors or land or mine owners. This 
created a small but selected and powerful elite.66 The Indians were simp-
ly not seen as equals, even taking into account what the Recopilación de 
Indias said about such treatments. 
The elites in the Peruvian Viceroyalty presented an additional 
peculiarity: economic and governmental power was held together.67 Be-
cause of how the conquest was executed, the conquerors would acquire 
extensive resources in the colonies. They, representing the government 
of Spain, decided who owned what, and, as can be imagined, they were 
the principal owners.68 Meanwhile, the British Empire at the beginning 
did not pay much attention to their colonies, letting the colonizers settle 
in the new land. Because they didn’t discover any mines, there was little 
incentive for the degree of governmental control that the Spaniards had 
over Mexico and Peru. Also, because they didn’t encounter a populous 
civilization, they didn’t see a valuable source of labor in the Indians.  
When the British shifted their goals from finding mines to creat-
ing wealth through manufacture and agriculture, they started to send 
                                                
65 See also RICHARD AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE 
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also rebels of the Spanish crown), was hanged in a cage in the central plaza of Lima as a remainder 
of the power of the Spanish crown. However, as mentioned by de Solorzano, “las Leyes Nuevas” 
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many more colonists to settle the land. In contrast to what we find in the 
Spanish colonies, in North America, white Europeans were not only the 
ruling class, but also the most common race in the land. The British rec-
reated a new Britain in North America, instead of creating an oppressive 
regime as the Spaniards did in their colonies. Or, to view it from another 
perspective, the Indians oppressed in North America were, by far, a mi-
nority.69  
E. The Pattern Behind the Parties’ Perspectives 
The Spaniards established an extractive economy in their colo-
nies because it was cheap. They had the mineral resources, and the hu-
man capital was practically free. The Spaniards could exploit the land, 
the mines, and labor. They didn’t create new productive economies or 
implement new technology because it wasn’t worth it. Implementing new 
sources of wealth, or installing new technologies required investment and 
startup costs. With mining, the Spaniards almost had no initial cost. This 
tradition has been perpetuated until today, drawing a clear pattern that 
feeds the mentioned perspectives of the urban citizens and the rural 
communities in Section I. 
In 1792, less than 30 years before the independence of Peru, citi-
zens of Arequipa asked the viceroy of Peru for permission to create a 
mining society. Peruvian elites had internalized the Spanish practice, 
principally because they were descendants of the Spaniards (all the sig-
natories of such petitions had Spanish surnames). Within the petition, 
they analyzed the possibility of constituting a company in the manufac-
turing or agricultural sectors, but they preferred mining because it would 
“enrich the country”, relegating the other activities to the future.70 
As described by Sokoloff and Egerman, “elite families generally 
acted as local representatives of the Spanish government in the country-
side during the colonial period and maintained their status long after in-
dependence.”71 Independence didn’t return the country to the Inca Em-
pire, nor did it rid the Peruvian economy from extractive practices. In-
                                                
69 The usage of words always says much about a particular reality. Even though in British and 
North American academia the word “colonizers” is used indistinctly for the Spanish and the British 
occupation in the New World, in Spanish and Latino American academia you would find a marked 
difference. The British in America would be called “colonizers”, while the Spaniards in America 
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70 See DE LA FUENTE Y LOAYZA AND OTHER CITIZENS FROM AREQUIPA: PROYECTO Y 
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stead, descendants of the conquerors led the process of independence: the 
elite was kept protected. 
According to Pedro Benavides’ 1827 Manual del Abogado 
Americano (Manual of the American Lawyer), after independence, the 
mines were owned by the government72 instead of the Crown. Just as 
during the Peruvian viceroyalty, people could exploit the mines in return 
for a tax paid to the government (during the viceroyalty, this tax was paid 
to the Spanish Empire). For this reason, the North Peruvian Civil Code of 
1836 didn’t regulate mines as goods, because they had an independent 
treatment establishing the rights of the government over them.73 
As the government maintained ownership and control of what 
supposedly was the greatest Peruvian resource, the mines, the economic 
elite remained entangled with the political ruling class. From 1821 to 
2001, Peru never had an indigenous president of Andean descent, with 
most of them being Spanish descended and from the coast instead. When 
Alejandro Toledo was proclaimed president of Peru in 2001, he held a 
special ceremony in Machu Picchu, Cusco, honoring the past of the Inca 
culture.74 He declared regarding this radical turn out after almost 200 
years, “hoy se reinicia el reencuentro de todas la sangres,” meaning, “to-
day all bloodlines begin to run together again.” The elite remained a 
small group for a long time. As Vicente Gay recounts,75 around 1924 the 
Peruvian population was divided as follows: 13 percent White, 1.9 per-
cent Black, 57.6 percent Indian, 24.8 percent Creole, and 1.9 percent 
Asian. 77 years passed between Vicente Gay’s demographic study and 
Alejandro Toledo’s presidential election, but the continuing claim is to 
push industrialization forward, as noted by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski,76 the 
president elected for the period 2016 to 2021. 
After the Spanish conquest we could see in Peru at least three 
patterns that fulfill the five mentioned perspectives: (i) a special prefer-
ence for mining (in general extractive economies, including oil, gas, or 
rubber), (ii) a quite small but strong elite, exclusive of the native peoples, 
and (iii) a disregard for the original natives in society. Of course, through 
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75 Gay, supra note 43, at 25. 
76 See Jimena Hernandez, PPK Apuesta por Impulsar la Industrializacion Minera, PERU21 
(Jul. 14, 2016), http://peru21.pe/economia/ppk-apuesta-impulso-industrializacion-minera-2251954. 
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the years the second and third pattern evolved. Nowadays original na-
tives have mixed in socially, culturally and economically. However, we 
can still find a great difference between the rural communities and the 
urban citizens, a parallel to the original Indian-Spanish distinction. No 
longer does the mita exist, forcing the rural communities to work for the 
mining companies, but we can see indifference from the urban citizens, 
and even eagerness to push forward mining projects without accounting 
for the effects that such extraction may have on the rural communities. 
As of 2015, 70 percent of the Peruvians did not have access to 
the financial system, unable to obtain loans, and in many cases no access 
to basic financial services like bank accounts.77 Such statistics are strik-
ing, because it is easy to see how the social structures that existed during 
the Spanish colonies echo in the current social system of Peru. This kind 
of extractive economy, based on a top-down property regime, when sus-
tained for hundreds of years, creates practices that are difficult to over-
come. The perspectives of the rural communities and the urban citizens 
towards the mining projects became patterns incubated for centuries, in-
grained in common perception. After this almost 500 years, reality 
squarely shows that mining is still the “jewel of the crown” in the Peru-
vian economy and everything that comes with that. In 2015, mining con-
stituted the largest portion of the annual gross domestic income.78 How-
ever, Peru remains a developing economy or third world country. 
III. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE MINING CONFLICT   
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María were supposed to bring 
wealth to Peru and to the rural communities that lived in the surround-
ings of the projects. When a mining project is executed, the mining com-
pany has to pay the Peruvian government for the right to exploit79 a roy-
alty for production80 and income tax.81 These three concepts are to be 
shared with the local counties where the mining project is to be executed: 
75 percent of the right to exploit, 100 percent of the royalty for produc-
tion and 20 percent of the applicable income tax82, with shared income 
tax the most important one by far. The right to exploit is based on fixed 
tariffs per square meter of the mining concession area and the royalty for 
production is around 1 percent of the gross sales of the mineral). 
                                                
77 Peru Ocupa el Puesto 11 en Ranking de Bancarizacion en America Latina, PERU21 (Feb. 5, 
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78 See Mineria Liderara Crecimiento de Economia Peruana en 2015, PERU21 (Feb. 14, 2015), 
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79 Law No. 014-92-EM, Jun. 2, 1992, art 57 (PERU). 
80 Law No. 179-2004-EF, Oct. 6 (PERU). 
81 General provisions of the Decreto Supremo N.° 179-2004-EF (Texto Único Ordenado de la 
Ley del Impuesto a la Renta). 
82 Law No. 28611, Jun. 24, 2007, art 142, 144, & 145 (PERU). 
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At the same time, and even though this is not enacted by law, 
mining companies often execute social projects to help the communities 
overcome the impact of the changes that the mining projects have on 
their environment. Also, those villagers who own property above the 
mineral fount ought to be paid for their land at the price that they freely 
negotiate with the mining company. Finally, according to Peruvian envi-
ronmental law, the mining company has to present an environmental 
management plan to be approved by the government, in order to ensure 
the protection of the environment. If the mining company fails to execute 
its environmental management plan, or if it damages a third party (like 
the rural communities), a liability rule will apply and the damage should 
be compensated.83 
This set of rules and practices is quite typical in different juris-
dictions as a compound of rules to make mining feasible. Nonetheless, 
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María did not go through. In the three 
cases, the mining endeavors were supposed to bring wealth; however, in 
all three cases, the mining goals clashed with the social wall of the rural 
communities. Why? Traditional economists may be puzzled by this out-
come, given that the mining projects were supposed to bring an efficient 
outcome to the mining companies, the Peruvian government, and the ru-
ral communities. In Pareto’s terms, these projects were to be efficient 
because all of the agents were supposed to win.84 In this sense, the reac-
tion of the rural communities was not foreseeable under the traditional 
economic theory. 
When we analyze this context through the prism of behavioral 
law and economics, the result is quite different. Traditional Law and 
Economics has as its main premise, that human behavior seeks rational 
maximization.85 This rational maximizing behavior is primarily identi-
fied with the production of wealth.86 In contrast, Behavioral Law and 
Economics approaches human behavior under three bases: bounded ra-
tionality (inconsistencies in the judgment or decision making process of 
human beings),87 bounded willpower (inconsistencies in reaching pro-
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posed goals), 88 and bounded self-interest (restraint in our individualistic 
or profit-seeking realms).89 
Through these three premises, behavioral law and economics at-
tempts to predict human behavior more accurately than traditional law 
and economics90 by trying to include the “human” side of humans in the 
analysis. So then, what explains the failure of Tambo Grande, Conga, 
and Tía María to see the light of day? We will try to understand the five 
mentioned patterns in Section I using the following behavioral law and 
economics biases related with bounded rationality:  
 
• Heuristic Representativeness: A tendency of urban citizens to 
consider irrational the negative attitude of the rural communities 
towards mining projects that are to be executed within, or close 
to, their domains. 
• Heuristic Representativeness: A tendency of the rural communi-
ties to distrust the offers made by the urban citizens related to the 
mining projects. 
• Heuristic Availability: A tendency of rural communities to con-
sider that a mining project may result in an environmental disas-
ter that would change or destroy their way of living.  
• Status Quo Bias: A preference from the Peruvian urban citizens 
to promote mining as the most valuable source of economic in-
come.  
• Status Quo Bias and Endowment Effect: A resistance from rural 
communities to allow or transfer entitlements to the mining 
companies so they can execute their project, preferring to pre-
serve their current way of living. 
A. Heuristic representativeness: the tendencies of urban citizens to con-
sider rural communities “ignorant” and of rural communities to distrust 
promises made by urban citizens 
When a social conflict arises, as it did in the cases of Tambo 
Grande, Conga, and Tía María, a constant claim from urban citizens is 
that the rural villagers “refuse to progress,” “irrationally reject the min-
ing business,” or that they are just “ignorant.” If Pedro was described as 
a person who has rejected the intrusion of a private company investment 
near his home because it would change his way of living, many times an 
average person in Peru would think this was a description of a villager 
                                                
88 Jolls, supra note 87, at 1479. 
89 Id. at 1479 (A landmark experiment of bounded self-interest is the “Ultimatum Game,” also 
commented by the authors). 
90 Id. at 1484-1485. 
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from the Andean highlands of Peru fighting against a mining company. 
However, this would not be an accurate understanding. 
Even though urban citizens have this perception of rural villag-
ers, many wealthy or middle class families from the coast have been in 
Pedro’s situation. In 2007, Olympic Peru, Inc.,91 obtained a concession 
for the extraction of gas and oil in the department of Piura on the north-
ern coast of Peru. Part of the concession area passed through Colan, a 
well-known beach of Piura where many middle class and wealthy people 
of the region would spend their summers. The concession created an 
immediate rejection from the summer vacationers, which led to different 
initiatives to block the activities of the investor.  
Something quite similar happened in 2010 on Ancon, a classic 
beach for vacationers in Lima. Santa Sofia Puertos, a company owned by 
a Peruvian economic group called the Grupo Romero, wanted to build a 
port in the vicinities of Ancon. The vacationers that had traditionally 
come to the beach rejected the project and fueled protests against it.92 
During this time, there were many cars visible around the streets of Lima 
with bumper stickers saying “No al Puerto de Ancón.” 
In Colan and Ancon, people also showed the “Pedro effect;” they 
did not want the intrusion of a private company nearby their homes be-
cause it was going to change their way of living. The protesters here 
were not rural villagers, but upper-middle-class urban citizens.  
Why then would people identify Pedro’s description as a villager 
from the Andes of Peru, rejecting a mining company? This could be a 
heuristic representativeness bias. In terms of Shafir and Leboeuf heuristic 
representativeness is, “the tendency to evaluate the likelihood that a tar-
get belongs to a certain class based upon the degree to which the target 
resembles the prototypic class member.”93  
Humans unconsciously use reasoning shortcuts to affront life, 
creating a dual system within the human mind.94 System 1, our “Homer 
Simpson” part of the brain, responds automatically, assessing an answer 
based on our past experiences and perceptions, including stereotypes. 
System 2, on the other hand, our “Rene Descartes” part of the brain, 
takes a controlled and conscious step back from the information provid-
ed, to reason with analytical intelligence and then answer.  
                                                
91 OLYMPIC PERÚ INC., SUCURSAL DEL PERÚ, http://www.bnamericas.com/company-
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If throughout life, most of the red cars seen are Mercedes-
Benzes, when asked to guess which is the brand that makes more red 
cars, our “Homer Simpson” may answer Mercedes-Benz. In contrast, 
under the same situation our “Rene Descartes” may first analyze how 
many cars are produced by each car company every year, and if the com-
panies produced the same proportion of red cars. As can be easily 
guessed, our “Rene Descartes” may disagree with our “Homer Simpson,” 
answering that a company like Toyota produces more red cars than Mer-
cedes-Benz.  
Why don’t humans rely exclusively on their “Rene Descartes” 
brain while living? Basically, because humans have to live, and having 
the “Rene Descartes” answer all the obstacles we encounter would be too 
costly. Most daily decisions are made by our “Homer Simpson;” humans 
only use their “Rene Descartes” when they find it is worth it. 
Our “Homer Simpson” gives us an illusion of validity. In a well-
known field experiment, Tversky and Kahneman presented a description 
of a stereotypical librarian to a number of individuals, and asked which 
profession presented people with these characteristics. Because of the 
relatively larger number of existing farmers in relation with the existing 
librarians, the answer was supposed to be farmers, but most of the people 
picked librarians. The authors concluded, “Thus, people express great 
confidence in the prediction that a person is a librarian when given the 
description of his personality which matches the stereotype of librarians, 
even if the description is scanty, unreliable, or outdated.”95    
 “Homer Simpson” would react responding to what people con-
sider more frequent, creating stereotypes to assign objects to classes.96 
This may be happening with the Pedro effect. Urban citizens think it is 
normal that rural communities would be against a mining project in the 
vicinities of their villages, even though they themselves may have had 
the same reaction in Colan or Ancon. 
Where does the Pedro stereotype come from? And why do the 
urban citizens see this reaction as a negative? The answer to these ques-
tions are that it is arguably in the historical background of what urban 
citizens that react as the “Homer Simpson” have collected as normal or 
“valid” information. 
As shown in Section II, the Spanish elites historically took ad-
vantage of the Indians for the exploitation of mines. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.5, the dynamic between rural communities and urban citizens still 
has a lingering effect in the relationship between the conquerors and the 
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native Indians. The “otherness” that the urban citizens may feel toward 
the native Indians can create a disregard effect from the former over the 
latter.  
For centuries, political and economic powers in Peru have decid-
ed when, where and how to exploit mining resources, having normalized 
the making of these decisions without asking, even if the decisions affect 
Indians or rural communities. Therefore, the urban citizens as irrational 
traditionally view any complaint by the rural communities because tradi-
tionally what the rural communities say does not matter.  
The other side of the coin of this heuristic representativeness bias 
is in the rural communities. Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tia Maria show 
a tendency of the rural communities to distrust the offers made by the 
urban citizens related to the mining projects. However, behind the prom-
ises of the mining company there is now a complex supervision require-
ment by the government. It is the case that in Conga, as explained in Sec-
tion I, even an international technical opinion was issued, which was re-
viewed and approved by the Peruvian government, stating that the reser-
voirs would provide better water to the villagers than the water already 
existing in the lakes. However, no agreement was possible and the pro-
ject was also blocked. 
B. Heuristic availability: the tendency of rural communities to associate 
mining with harm 
Damages are a key element to consider when discussing mining 
projects with rural communities. It seems to be a tendency of the villag-
ers to be particularly suspicious with the possibility of suffering an acci-
dent while the mining project is in place. These accidents are specially 
related to damaging the rural communities’ environmental asset.  
Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tía María reveal the different types 
of damages feared by villagers. In Tambo Grande, the mining company 
planned to relocate the community, which implied an exchange of land 
and resituating the town in another part of the valley. The principal fear 
in this case was the effect that the mining activity was going to have over 
the agricultural land, both the land that did not have to be exchanged be-
cause it was not part of the project’s area, and the land that was going to 
be given to the mining company in exchange for the agricultural land that 
was above the minerals fount.  
In Conga part of the project implied emptying four lakes that 
were regularly used by the communities. In exchange, the mining com-
pany was going to build water reservoirs so the villagers would continue 
to have water for their consumption and agriculture. In this case, accord-
30 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 7:1 
ing to the independent international opinion,97 the water that was going 
to be in the reservoirs was supposed to be better than the water contained 
in the lakes. After different tests, the independent consultant determined 
that the four lakes presented high amounts of minerals in their waters, 
making them inadequate for human consumption or agriculture. Despite 
this, the communities did not want the reservoirs, believing that they 
were not going to have enough water to maintain their regular way of 
living.  
In Tía María, most of the people of Islay dedicated themselves to 
growing rice. The fears were similar to the ones in Tambo Grande. Even 
though the mine’s plan had to prevent any adverse effect in the agricul-
tural activities of the people of Islay, the villagers were afraid that some-
thing could go wrong.  
In these cases, “Homer Simpson” thinking appears again, 
through an availability heuristic bias. As explained by Tversky and 
Kahneman, “There are situations in which people assess the frequency of 
a class or the probability of an event by the ease which instances or oc-
currences can be brought to mind. For example, one may assess the risk 
of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such occurrence 
among one’s acquaintance.”98 The real statistical occurrence of the event 
is increased by a judgment error, coming from a past experience or stere-
otypical knowledge about these kinds of events. Also, humans will tend 
to increase their perception of the occurrence of the hazard if its material-
ization has a high saliency.99   
What context then creates an availability heuristic bias in the vil-
lagers? As a matter of fact, no accident has happened exactly in the way 
feared by the people in Tambo Grande, Conga or Tía María in Peru. 
However, there had been two very well known cases of damage caused 
by the activities of a mining project in recent Peruvian history. One was 
in Choropampa, a province of Cajamarca, and the other in Cerro de Pas-
co, a province of Pasco, both in the Andean highlands.  
a. Choropampa, Cajamarca 
Yanacocha, the same company that intended to implement Con-
ga, owns a gold mine located 45 kilometers to the north of Cajamarca, 
between three thousand five hundred and four thousand meters above the 
sea level. This mining company started its operations in August of 1993. 
It is the biggest gold company in South America, and the second largest 
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in the world. As part of its activities, the mining company needs mercury 
to process the gold that is extracted from the mine.100 On June 2, 2000, a 
Friday afternoon, between 4:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., a truck that was 
transporting mercury from Cajamarca to the mine spilled 151 kilograms 
of mercury along twenty-seven kilometers of roadway, crossing the 
community of Choropampa. At the same time, a circus was staying for 
the weekend in Choropampa, so there were many children around the 
city.  
When the night came, a group of workers from Yanacocha came 
to Choropampa, offering the community S/.100 (approx. $30) for each 
recovered kilogram of mercury. The adults and children of the village ran 
to grab the fluorescent silver liquid off the ground, some with their bare 
hands. That weekend the circus was full of children, but 750 people, 40 
percent being underage, later experienced intoxication from by the expo-
sure to mercury. After major litigation took place, many of the victims 
were compensated, with many discussions about the fairness of the 
amounts that were given to the plaintiffs. The consequences of exposure 
to the mercury were irreversible.101 
b. Cerro de Pasco, Pasco 
During the Spanish Conquest, the colonizers found that Cerro de 
Pasco had many sources of lead and zinc. They started exploiting the 
ores high in the mountains, 4,380 meters above the sea level. Through 
the years, after the Spaniards were expelled from the mines in 1820, the 
extraction continued by different miners until Cerro de Pasco Corp., an 
American company consolidated the mines in 1902. In 1973, Cerro de 
Pasco Corp. was expropriated by the military coup of Juan Velasco Al-
varado, changing its name to Centromin. In 1999, after the privatization 
of Centromin, the mine became Volcan Compañía Minera S.A.A, which 
has been in charge of the mines until the date hereof. Through the centu-
ries, the mine had coexisted with the town of Cerro de Pasco, with no 
environmental regulation in place. Because the mine has been extracting 
minerals through an open pit since 1956, the land, water, and houses of 
Cerro de Pasco are filled with toxic amounts of lead. Nine out of ten 
children present high rates of heavy metals in their blood, including lead, 
cadmium and arsenic. As time goes by, the mine expands operation and, 
even with the current environmental standards, the historical heritage of 
pollution haunts the city and its occupants.102 
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The Choropampa and Cerro de Pasco cases are quite different. 
Choropampa is a young mine (less than 30 years in operation), while 
Cerro de Pasco has been a mine since the Spanish colonies, with more 
than 400 years of history. In Choropampa, the accident was caused with-
in the lifetime of Yanacocha’s operation, while in Cerro de Pasco con-
tamination had been taking place long before the current owners of Vol-
can took control of the company. The common ground, though, is that 
the activity of the mine, directly or indirectly, brought despair to the 
communities that surrounded its operations. In both cases the villagers 
were damaged by the mine in different ways than what was expected 
from the people of Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tía María, but were 
damaged at the end of the day.  
By analyzing the Choropampa and Cerro de Pasco cases with the 
historical background commented in Section II, it becomes clear that for 
the communities that are directly affected by the mining activity, mining 
has been a synonym for change and destruction, instead of gold and sil-
ver. The treatment that Indian laborers received while working in the 
mines during the Spanish colonies damaged not only the individuals, but 
also their towns. The Spaniards would distribute Indians that lived in 
towns close to the mines to exploit the resources, changing dramatically 
the way of living in such communities.   
Mining history in Peru intensifies the availability bias of the ru-
ral communities: communities tend to consider that a mining project may 
change their environmental asset, changing their way of living.    
Notwithstanding the above mentioned, this does not mean that 
most of the current mining endeavors present cases as the ones feared in 
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María, or the ones occurring in Choro-
pampa and Cerro de Pasco. Especially if considering the number of envi-
ronmental accidents in Peruvian history, taking into account that the Pe-
ruvian economy has been, and currently is, based on mining since the 
beginning of the Spanish conquest.  The probability of environmental 
damage may be overestimated. This explains why the rural communities 
that will be affected by mining activities tend to be afraid of being dam-
aged in their way of living, overweighing an accident’s saliency.    
C. Status quo bias: the tendencies of urban citizens to prefer extraction 
and of rural communities to preserve their traditional activities   
In Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María, the urban society was 
in favor of the mining projects. In fact, after the conflicts in Conga start-
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ed, the editors of El Comercio, the most important newspaper in Peru, 
published an article supporting the mining project.103  
According to El Comercio, mining was necessary for the devel-
opment of Peru. Even though the editors of the newspaper were consid-
ered in favor of diversify the economy, closing the doors to the invest-
ments in mining would lead Peru to fall into a vicious circle. In order to 
create new business and wealth, education and infrastructure had to be 
improved. In order to improve education and infrastructure, money was 
needed. In order to obtain money, the government would need to raise 
taxes. Finally, if the government raises taxes, investors would not have 
incentives to create new business and wealth. Therefore, mining was 
necessary at the beginning in order to break this vicious circle.  
This story may sound familiar. It is interesting how El Comercio 
claimed the exact same argument in 2012 that the citizens of Arequipa 
gave to the viceroy of Peru for opening a mining society in 1792. They 
also said let’s first erect the mining society, or company, to enrich the 
country, so later the future generations are going to be able to invest in 
different businesses.104 This was more than 220 years ago, and future 
generations are still claiming the same. In fact, as exposed in Section II, 
since the beginning of the Spanish colonies in the early 1520s, mining 
has been the preferred economic activity and this vicious circle has not 
been broken.  
Why then, after all these years, do urban citizens have blind faith 
in the mining businesses? The answer may lie in in a status quo bias in 
favor of mining that has been incubated for centuries.  
Samuelson and Zeckhauser developed the definition of the status 
quo bias while researching the decision of employees of Harvard Univer-
sity in selecting their health insurance plan, and the election of retirement 
plans by university faculties across the country. They discovered that 
“many people make the same choices year after year in important period-
ic decisions. It is the rare individual who fine-tunes such choices to 
changing economic circumstances, even though the transition costs may 
be small and the importance great.”105 In other words, they found that 
when the Harvard employees or the faculty under study had a given 
health or retirement plan they would remain with the status quo, even 
when there were a better option available them. Hence, humans tend to 
fail to select the option that would maximize their current status when 
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they have a choice to maintain the status quo.  This experience is called 
bounded rationality.  Applying this logic to a practice that has been car-
ried along for centuries, the status quo will become pervasive,106 appear-
ing out of convenience, habit, inertia, or custom.107  
The Peruvian elites have always identified mining as their im-
mediate salvation, remaining loyal to such activity across the centuries. 
When deciding to assign resources in a new endeavor, most of the an-
swers have been to keep the traditional answer even when this wasn’t 
necessarily the best response. As Samuelson and Zeckhauser explain, 
“indeed, one alternative inevitably carries the label status quo – that is, 
doing nothing or maintaining one´s current or previous decision is almost 
always a possibility.”108 
At the same time, the tendency of the rural communities to reject 
mining projects that are to be executed in their vicinities has been in 
place for as long as the tendency of the Peruvian elites to want to execute 
mining projects. Since the Spanish colonies, many abuses were per-
formed over the people that would work in the mines and their communi-
ties. Cities such as Cerro de Pasco109 and Potosí110 are good examples of 
the effect mining had historically in these communities. After being the 
centers of bullion of the world for years, now they are polluted towns 
with high rates of poverty. In reaction to this historical context, many 
rural communities may experience a pervasive status quo effect when 
asked about the entrance of a mining project in their provinces, prefer-
ring to maintain their economic system as it is without the mining activi-
ty. 
Why is the status quo so hard to overcome? In the following we 
deconstruct the analysis for the case of the urban citizens and the rural 
communities. 
1. Status Quo Bias in the Urban Citizens 
Transition costs 
Status quo will be especially “sticky” when the transition costs 
overcome the efficiency gain associated with the superior alternative.111 
The Peruvian economy has been traditionally based on mining instead of 
industrial activities. Even though it is possible to diversify the economy, 
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creating different businesses has transition costs that should be consid-
ered,112 and those could block new ventures.  
Loss Aversion 
Given that most of the time the status quo is taken as the refer-
ence point, it is easy to foresee how loss aversion may block decisions to 
change the status quo. In the words of Samuelson and Zeckhauser, “tak-
ing the status quo as the reference point, the individual weights potential 
losses from switching as larger than potential gains. Because of loss 
aversion, the individual is biased in favor of the status quo.”113 Another 
view as explained by Shafir and Leboeuf is, “loss aversion also creates a 
general reluctance to trade or depart from the status quo, because the dis-
advantages of departing from it loom larger than the advantages of the 
alternatives.”114 
Applying loss aversion theory to our case, we see how the urban 
citizens may be afraid to change mining for other activities because min-
ing has been producing wealth for the government (first for the Spanish 
Crown, and after independence for the Peruvian government) and the 
economy for centuries. Even though different ventures may create more 
productivity than mining, the status quo makes it harder to turn the 
wheel.    
Psychological constraints   
The status quo may prevail due to psychological constraints. We 
will refer to three particular cases: (i) the existence of sunk costs, (ii) the 
possibility of regret avoidance and (iii) the drive for consistency. 
i. Sunk Costs 
Peru has evolved a mining economy since the 1500s. In the 
meantime, investment had been injected into this activity, creating legal 
structures and physical infrastructure to take advantage of the minerals. 
This investment would be a sunk cost, as a cost that was needed to exe-
cute the activity but has been already performed.115  
According to traditional economists, sunk costs are not consid-
ered when making new decisions, because the expected utility does not 
depend on it. However, Behavioral Law and Economics has proven that 
they do affect decisions, with a greater tendency to continue with a ven-
ture once investment has been executed for the project.116 When a sunk 
cost is made for a status quo activity, as is the case of mining in Peru, the 
pervasiveness of changing the activity is even greater.117 The reason for 
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this is related to prospect theory. After investing in a particular activity, 
the impact of subsequent spending of resources decreases, while the ex-
pectation of any positive outcome is overvalued. People would be prone 
to keep investing, hoping for a future good result or, in this case, as El 
Comercio says, keep investing in mining with the hopes of getting out of 
the vicious circle at some point.  
ii. Regret Avoidance 
Individuals tend to feel greater regret from negative outcomes 
resulting from their decisions than those resulting from their inactivity.118 
Past experiences create a psychological constrain to, if possible, avoid 
decisions that may create a negative outcome.119 Why then should Peru-
vians keep supporting mining instead of shifting their attention to other 
economic activities? Any new venture contains a risk in of itself; it could 
just not be a good business. If we consider that mining has been the prin-
cipal vein of economic growth in Peru from time immemorial, one can 
see that the urban citizens may experience regret avoidance in not sup-
porting such activity.   
iii. Drive for consistency 
People try to be consistent with their decisions. Therefore, indi-
viduals tend to suppress information indicating that a past decision was 
an error, lowering their level of self-critique.120 This unconscious process 
may compel individuals to remain within the status quo to protect former 
decisions. If the urban citizens of Peru have always favored mining busi-
nesses and all of a sudden they shift their support to another activity, the 
underlying question would be if they were in error for all these years, 
tending to remain in the status quo to avoid such question.  
2. Status Quo Bias in the Rural Communities 
Transition Costs 
The Tambo Grande and Tía María projects were supposed to 
change the economic activities of the rural communities that were to sell 
their agricultural land. If the rural villager is a young person, his transi-
tion costs to begin a different economic activity may be low, but if the 
villager is more than sixty years old, and has devoted his life to agricul-
ture, the transition costs may be very high. This “stickiness” becomes 
stronger when the decision implies an irreversible change, because of the 
higher stakes in play. If after selling his agricultural land, the villager is 
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not going to be able to grow rice in any nearby land, he would not have 
any other option than to venture into a new economic activity. 
Loss aversion 
The villagers of Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María put more 
weight on the eventual loss of their land, their lakes or their agricultural 
way of living than what the urban citizens were offering. Preferring the 
status quo, the execution of the projects was blocked in the three cases.   
Psychological Constraints 
As in section 3.3.1, we will refer to: (i) the existence of sunk 
costs, (ii) the possibility of regret avoidance, and (iii) the drive for con-
sistency. 
i. Sunk Costs 
If Peru has evolved a mining economy since the 1500s, rural 
communities evolved agriculture from time immemorial as well. When 
the Spaniards came, the Inca economy was principally based on agricul-
ture. The native cultures of Peru even evolved special terraces to experi-
ment in agriculture with different ecosystems, with Moray in Cusco as 
the best example.121 The most natural activity for rural communities is 
agriculture and, therefore, many of these communities had to invest all 
their life and capital on agriculture. This traditional investment in agri-
cultural efforts can be seen as a considerable sunk cost in the status quo 
of agricultural activities. The mere possibility of changing this activity 
for anything proposed by the mining company or the government may 
present the typical resistance that the status quo bias shows. 
ii. Regret Avoidance 
After all the history between mining and rural communities in 
Peru, it is easy to see that villagers would be cautious in allowing a min-
ing endeavor on their land. Regret avoidance will prevent the rural com-
munities from opting out of the status quo.  
iii. Drive for consistency 
Most of the time, rural families have been working in agriculture 
for generations. Elderly villagers do not consider that their offspring will 
change activities, but believe they will stay on the same path: agriculture. 
Mining in their provinces may affect their agriculture, so they may tend 
to prefer the status quo.   
D. Endowment effect: Rural Communities “Can´t drink gold”  
The stories of Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tía María are testi-
monies of the same pattern: a resistance from rural communities to allow 
or transfer entitlements to the mining companies so they can execute 
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their project. In all three cases protests took place, and no agreement was 
possible.  
It is important to notice that not all of the villagers are directly 
affected by the mining projects. There are some cases were individuals 
ought to sell their land to the mining company because their land is with-
in the area of influence of the project. In those cases, the effect of the 
mining activity hits directly to the property of the landowner, and they 
will bargain to transfer ownership. However, in many cases the effect 
over the rural communities is broader and less defined because it only 
affects the environmental asset. In the cases of Tambo Grande and Tía 
María for example, people were afraid that the mining activity would 
change the nature of their agricultural land, requiring them to change 
their economic activity. Equivalently in Conga, people were afraid that 
the reservoirs would not satisfy the demand for water they had, which 
would have made them unable to continue with their agricultural busi-
ness or use the water for human consumption. 
In the three cases, the people of Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía 
María did not own the property rights over the entitlement they were 
afraid to lose: in Tambo Grande and Tia Maria, the fertility of the soil in 
the valley, in Conga the water in the lakes. The environmental asset is, 
legally, a public good. Even though they did not have any exclusive enti-
tlement that allowed them to exclude a third party to use such environ-
mental goods, they enforced their “grey” entitlements over the environ-
mental asset by force, finally blocking the intrusion of the mining pro-
ject. 
The reaction of the communities does not rely on the sharing the 
environmental asset with the mining company (work in the same valley, 
or disposition of the lakes) but principally on the effect this sharing will 
have over the villagers. If the mining project abuses these resources, 
damaging the communities as was referred to in Section 3.2, the life of 
these communities will change forever. Because of the intimate relation-
ship these people have with their environment, if it changes, they will 
have to change too.  
Many of these rural communities’ mix subsistence economies 
with a rudimentary form of commerce, selling what they produce. If the 
land is not productive for agricultural purposes anymore, then the rural 
communities are going to have to buy food instead of eating what they 
produce. Because they are not going to be able to sell the goods they 
produce in the markets, they are not going to be able to gain money, nor 
buy food with such money. This explains the motto used by the commu-
nities in Conga: “you can’t drink gold.” Referring to the lakes in a quite 
clever phrase, the villagers were explaining this reality. In an economy as 
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the one they have, a disequilibrium in the environmental conditions 
could be fatal. 
The difference between the status quo bias and endowment ef-
fect is quite narrow.122 While the status quo bias refers to a tendency in 
individuals to prefer their current situation instead of venturing into new 
possibilities that could bring them equal or more satisfaction, the en-
dowment effect refers to the valuation that such individuals may have of 
their status quo within a scenario of a potential transaction.123 In other 
words, the owner, or whoever is considered to be the owner of a good 
may be affected by the endowment effect (in our case the rural communi-
ties).   
In 1980, Richard Thaler was first commented on the “endow-
ment effect.”124 Considering Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical find-
ings,125 Thaler realized that the valuation of an object by an individual 
may substantially increase after the person receives such object,126 block-
ing a possible transaction. Imagine that Homer buys a piece of land for 
$10,000 to plant his crops. Two years later a mining company discovers 
that there is gold underneath Homer’s land, jumping the price of the land 
up to $15,000. Homer would never pay $15,000 to buy an equivalent 
piece of land. Would Homer sell his land for $15,000?  
According to the endowment effect, Homer probably would not 
sell his land. After Homer receives the entitlement over the land, its val-
uation rises. The endowment effect creates a gap between Homer’s offer 
selling and offer buying price. As explained by Korobkin, “the same per-
son will often demand a higher price to sell an entitlement that is part of 
his endowment than he will pay for the same entitlement if it is not part 
of his endowment.”127 
The reasons for the existence of the endowment effect are quite 
similar to the ones given for the status quo bias, mainly loss aversion and 
regret avoidance.128 As an irreversible choice will strengthen the status 
quo bias, a lack of a substitute goods intensifies the endowment effect.129 
In Tambo Grande and Tía María, the endowment effect may ap-
pear in cases where the mining company wants to acquire the villagers’ 
land. The owner may value his land more than what he would be willing 
to pay for it in a similar situation, blocking the transaction. However, it is 
also important to consider that the endowment effect does not only ap-
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pear over physical goods, but also over rights or extralegal entitlements 
that would not be considered as legal property rights.130  
The people from Tambo Grande and Tía María did not have any 
property rights, nor had they any legal right to decide what could be per-
formed over land that was part of the valley but was not owned by the 
villagers. Equivalently, the people from Conga did not own the lakes that 
were going to be affected by the mining company. None of them owned 
the environmental asset, this being a public good, and, therefore, they 
were not entitled to exclude third parties from its usage. However, the 
possession that the villagers had de facto from time and memorial over 
the environmental asset created the psychological endowment.  
Due to the endowment effect, villagers could value their land 
higher than what they would pay for it if they did not own it. Also, rural 
communities may present an extralegal endowment over their environ-
ment factor, trying to exclude third parties that attempt to enjoy such 
good without their acceptance. In the latter case, their endowment would 
also tend to be higher than what they would pay if they were newcomers 
in the valley and wanted like to use these resources.  
IV. THE CURRENT PROPERTY STRUCTURE OF THE MINING CONFLICT: 
CONFLICTED ENTITLEMENTS 
The mining conflict seems to have an explanation under the 
prism of Behavioral Law and Economics. For centuries, the history of 
mining in Peru has incubated biases amongst the urban citizens and the 
rural communities. There has been a constant struggle between these 
groups during the expansion of the mining business in Peru. This strug-
gle has ended in conflict in the cases of Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía 
María. The urban citizens wanted these mining projects to be executed; 
the rural communities did not. Did the urban citizens have a right to fight 
for the mining project, however? Equivalently, were the rural communi-
ties entitled to fight against the mining project? In other words, who cur-
rently owns what? And what is the protection rule? 
As we will see in the following section, the mining conflict not 
only results in the clash of urban citizens and rural communities, but also 
yields questions about legal or formal rights in contrast with non-legal or 
informal rights. The former is upheld and protected by the law, the latter 
by the people.  
A. Legal or formal rights over land and the environmental asset 
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María involved discussions 
about the rights over two different types of goods: land and the environ-
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mental asset. According to the Peruvian legal system, the rural communi-
ties owned the land and had the right to enjoy the environmental asset. 
Since the environmental asset is a public good, the urban citizens (in-
cluding the mining companies and the government) also had the right to 
enjoy it.  
Since the communities owned the land, they had the right to ex-
clude any third party that wanted to use their goods. If the mining com-
pany wanted to use the rural communities’ land, they then had to buy it 
from them. This good is protected by a property rule:131 nobody is able to 
affect or dispose of the land if the communities do not give their consent. 
On the other hand, because the environmental asset is a public 
good, the rural communities are not able to exclude any third party from 
its use, including the mining companies or the government. Everyone is 
able to access the lakes from Conga, and nobody can be excluded from 
them. Then, if the mining company destroys the lakes, a liability rule will 
apply, and the former users of the lakes would be compensated.132 
The environmental asset is contained within the soil of the valley 
in Tambo Grande and Tía María. The owners of land in both valleys 
have the right to enjoy their land however they want, owing to their 
property right over the premises. These owners are entitled to an individ-
ual private right, but all premises are interconnected below ground to a 
common good: the quality of the soil.  
Underneath the earth, we cannot separate the land in hermetic 
boxes. The characteristics of the soil are shared within the valley, and the 
changes occurring over one piece of land may also affect other surround-
ing land plots in the valley. If one piece of land gets flooded with water, 
this water will drain into the neighbors’ estate. If instead of water we 
have chemical waste from the processing of a mining company, the ef-
fect is more complicated. Eventually, the characteristics that made the 
soil rich for planting crops may vanish, rendering the land infertile.   
In addition to the liability rule, the rural communities are entitled 
to a consultation right to protect their environmental asset. In Peru, as in 
many other nations around the globe, communities whose environmental 
asset is to be affected by a project such as Tambo Grande, Conga or Tía 
María, have the right of being consulted about the project.133 This norm 
does not give the villagers a veto right but rather endows them solely 
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with the right to be heard. The consultation right does not change the 
mentioned liability rule because it is the only protection rule the rural 
communities will have if the environmental asset is damaged; however it 
does give them a right to be asked and heard. 
In other words, the environmental asset provides open access to 
whomever wants to use the good. Using the lake example, if any urban 
citizen or rural community wants to use the lake they can, and they do 
not need permission to do so. In the particular case of mining companies, 
they are required to ask for an environmental authorization that will be 
approved by the government, but once it is granted, they can also use the 
water. The limit is that they do not have any exclusion rights over any 
other party that is using the water of the lake.  
If nobody has an exclusion right over the usage of the lake, and 
everyone wants to use it, what will happen? All the actors will use it, 
because it is free. However, none will have incentives to take care of it 
because their investment will be enjoyed by all the users and not only by 
the investors. Hence, the lake may dry up or become polluted. In this 
case, we encounter the well-known tragedy of the commons.134  
The tragedy here can appear in two different ways depending of 
the needs of the actor owning the lake. If the players need the water, their 
use of the lake will consist of taking water “out.”  If the players need the 
lake to discard waste, their use of the lake will consist of putting waste 
“in.”135 In both cases the lake is damaged.  
This “tragedy” would not be a tragedy if the lake was an unlim-
ited or unpollutable resource, but it is neither. The tragedy of the com-
mons appears when the good that is subject to open access is a scarce 
resource.136  
Rural communities use and pollute the lake on a regular basis. 
However, the intensity of their use is low enough not to affect the re-
source dramatically. That is also why the rural communities will not pre-
sent any claim if newcomers in their village start using the lake’s water. 
When the mining company comes into picture, the intensity of the over-
all usage of the lake may increase in a way that makes the resource be-
come scarce because it cannot support the new frequency of enjoyment 
by its users. 
This explains part of the heuristic availability explained in sec-
tion 2.2. The heuristic availability of the rural communities (with the 
predisposition to consider that mining projects may damage the envi-
ronmental asset) has in its core the fear of a tragedy of the commons. 
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This fear may also explain the reaction of the communities: to rise up 
and fight.  
B. Non-legal or informal rights over the environmental asset 
Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María created great social dis-
ruption, pushing the government and the mining companies to initiate 
negotiations with the rural communities. What are the implications of 
such uprisings? They have come to represent an attempt by the rural 
communities to exclude urban citizens, which are represented in this case 
by the mining companies and the government, from the environmental 
asset. The rural communities attempt to assert themselves as the owners 
of the environmental asset, protecting it by a de facto property rule.137  
At the root of the uprisings is the exclusion of local communities 
in the consultation process. Because these communities do not have a 
veto right, they are rarely granted participation opportunities when min-
ing projects are initiated in their region. Then, when the project is all set 
to start, the land of the mining area is bought and the equipment put in 
place, and demonstrations burst onto the streets blocking the project. 
Through their protests, rural communities managed to paralyze Tambo 
Grande, Conga and Tía María without having a formal right to do it, nor 
a property right to exclude any third party. 
We see how the extralegal right over the abovementioned envi-
ronmental asset is enforced de facto, and, in this case, by force. This has 
happened before in many parts of the world,138 and it has been duly ex-
amined in the Peruvian case by Hernando de Soto.139 The legal or formal 
rights clash with the non-legal or informal rights. The sustained posses-
sion and control of the rural communities over the environmental asset 
grants them a sense of ownership. What is ownership after all? The legal 
concept of property was created a long time after humans appeared. At 
the beginning of time there was no law, but only people, possession, and 
the pursuit of survival.  
Image a caveman chasing a deer. After hitting it with an arrow 
he spends five hours chasing the wounded animal. Another caveman 
passes by and grabs it. What would you think the hunter’s reaction would 
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be? There will likely be a fight over the deer. The same sense of “proper-
ty” will be present when you call a taxi that a skipper steals from you.  
This is related to the endowment effect explained in section 3.4 
above. As mentioned, the endowment effect may appear with or without 
a legal provision that creates a right over the good. Possession is the 
main creator of the endowment, as at the beginning it was the best crea-
tor of property. Thus, the endowment effect only appears in rural com-
munities because only they possess the environmental asset. Possession 
itself makes them consider endowed with the environmental asset, caus-
ing an endowment effect (a gap between selling and buying valuation).  
Through time, possession was transformed into property, and 
property was transformed into law.140 The recognition of such ownership 
based on possession brings the Lockean concept of property system to 
life (the bottom-up property regime). 
The problem in Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tía María is that the 
formal law did not consider the non-legal rule that was already acting on 
the ground. When urban citizens attempted to make decisions concerning 
the environmental asset without courting the approval of the rural com-
munities, the sense of ownership appeared and, as with the caveman and 
the pedestrian whose taxi was stolen, they protested.  
For this reason, De Soto states, “formal Law is increasingly los-
ing its legitimacy as people continue to create property beyond its 
reach,”141 adding that “when mandatory law does not square with these 
extralegal conventions, the parties to those conventions will resent and 
reject the intrusion.”142 143 Thus, the social disruption in Tambo Grande, 
Conga and Tía María was anything but unforeseeable.  
This extralegal allocation of entitlements over the environmental 
asset is not only costly but also complex. We set aside the traditional 
property rights over land to discover a spider web of rights that intercon-
nects different individual private rights over land into a common good. 
Therefore, the claim is not isolated to one owner but is common to all the 
members of the rural community that share the environmental asset by 
virtue of their mutual geographical location.144  
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The consultation right and the explained liability rule formally 
assign the rural communities with the environmental asset, recognizing 
the complex entanglement between private and public goods. Although 
this legal entitlement is a “grey” property right. Rural communities pre-
tend to clear such right by force, transforming the consultation right into 
a veto right and the liability rule into a property rule. An extralegal one, 
modifying the content of such entitlement, reshapes the legal allocation 
of the environmental asset.  
The goal of the following Section is to reorganize the system, 
aiming to reconcile legal and extralegal systems, urban citizens and rural 
communities, as well as law and force.   
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A PROPERTY RULE FOR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES 
A. Specifying the Problem 
If the rural communities are legally owners of their lands and de 
facto owners of the environmental asset, why don’t they reach an agree-
ment with the urban citizens (mining companies and the government) to 
transfer such rights? According to the Coase theorem, when transactional 
costs are manageable, goods would end in the hands of who values them 
more.145 If urban citizens consider that the mining projects are to be prof-
itable, why are they not able to reach an agreement with the rural com-
munities? 
Tambo Grande included an investment of $405 million in a town 
where the average inhabitant earns two dollars per day. Conga included 
an investment of  $5 billion in a region with a 50% poverty rate. Tía Ma-
ría included an investment of $1.4 billion and the creation of over 3,000 
new jobs. Given the poverty within these rural communities, why were 
they unable to reach an agreement? Dialogue opportunities were ar-
ranged but yielded little progress. 
Arguably, the appearance of a status quo bias146 or an endow-
ment effect147 could block the bargaining, putting in doubt the validity of 
the Coase theorem. Korobkin in particular has proposed creating multiple 
or competing reference points, “obscuring” the existing entitlements148 
(not establishing a clear owner). In our particular case it is important to 
also add the judgment biases mentioned in Section II, and the patterns 
explained in that section.  
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If we return to the mentioned patterns of perception of the urban 
and rural communities, we can appreciate how these irremediably 
clashed with one another. Urban citizens tend to identify rural communi-
ties as radical protesters against mining, whilst rural communities typi-
cally distrust urban citizens’ promises and overestimate the potential 
damage mining could do to the environmental asset. Urban citizens tend 
to prefer the promotion of mining endeavors, while the rural communi-
ties tend to prefer their current economic activities, such as agriculture. 
Also, the rural communities will experience an endowment effect in the 
decision-making process. As possessors of the environmental asset, they 
experience a gap between their selling and buying price, making the 
transfer of the environmental effect sticky.  
It seems that the initial stands for negotiation are too far apart, 
and that is exactly because the entitlements over the environmental asset 
are “obscure,” as proposed by Korobkin, “fuzzy,”149 as explained by 
Carol Rose, or “grey,” as defined by hereof. The keystone of the problem 
is the environmental asset. Individual owners will tend to sell their land 
if they are offered a convincing price. Each owner makes unique deci-
sions regarding the sale of their land, and the mining company would 
have to negotiate case by case. However, the environmental asset further 
complicates the dynamic because it is a shared good over which individ-
ual owners do not have selling power to negotiate unilaterally. Even in 
the cases of Tambo Grande and Tía María, the problem was not to sell 
individual land. The problem was the effect the mining activity would 
have on the environmental asset during the execution of the mining pro-
ject.  
Because the environmental asset is a public good, urban citizens 
believe that rural communities do not have any decision to make in the 
execution of the mining project. They have the consultation right so they 
can give their opinion, but they do not have decision-making power re-
garding whether the mining project goes through or not. Legally, they do 
not have any right to exclude because they do not have property rights 
over the public good. 
On the other hand, the rural communities do not only believe that 
they have the right to be consulted about the execution of the project but 
that they have the right to authorize or deny its execution. They believe 
that they should have a veto right. Why? Because they are and have been 
in possession of the environmental component for years (centuries in 
some cases).  
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The urban citizens based their beliefs on black letter law, offer-
ing the rural communities only a consultation right and a liability rule in 
case of harm. The rural communities, in exchange, based their beliefs on 
custom and possession over the resources, considering themselves en-
dowed with the environmental asset and entitled with a property rule. 
This discussion recalls the formation of property rights in the 
Spanish colonies in contrast with the British colonies. The presence of 
the government in the former Spanish colonies was higher than in the 
former British colonies. Because of the gold and silver that the Spaniards 
found in Peru and Mexico, they created a top-down property regime, 
centralizing the ownership and distribution of entitlements. In contrast, 
the British colonies implemented the bottom-up property system -- a 
Lockean view of property. The government recognized the private acqui-
sition of property. 
Almost 500 years later, the same dynamic has manifested. The 
position of the urban citizens (specially the government) is sustained in a 
top-down property regime. The government decides where and how the 
mining project will be executed. For that same reason, the Peruvian gov-
ernment has maintains the ownership of all the mineral resources in Pe-
ruvian soil according to the Peruvian Constitution.150  
In contrast, the position of the rural communities is sustained in a 
Lockean structure of property, or a bottom-up regime. The rural commu-
nities have guarded and nurtured their environment factor for centuries. 
Whether good or bad, they have managed their resources — controlling 
them, and investing in them — from time immemorial.  
This clash of views presents a great problem. According to both 
parties, they are entitled to the environmental asset. One of the basic as-
sumptions in the Coase theorem is that the entitlement that will be bar-
gained for needs to be initially assigned to one of the parties.151 In the 
cases under analysis, we can see that there is no real assignment of the 
entitlement, given that the environmental asset is a public good. Because 
of the clash of the legal and extralegal systems explained in section IV, 
the urban citizens and the rural communities consider themselves entitled 
to decide the destiny of the environmental asset. A transactional ap-
proach to making decisions as to the disposition of the public good there-
fore is not possible, because it is not clear from whom the right to the 
good should be purchased. 
The discussion gets especially sensitive when we consider that 
rural communities protest and fight in order to be recognized jointly as 
the owners of the environmental asset. One of the main goals of any legal 
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system is to create a system, so force is not the source of law.152 Any 
time a rural community raises in arms, they challenge the legal system. 
Any time they win such a fight, the legal order loses legitimacy. 
As we have seen, the rural communities won this fight in Tambo 
Grande, Conga, and Tia Maria. This takes us to a second level of analy-
sis: through conflict, the rural communities obtained a de facto “clear” 
entitlement over the environmental asset, protected by an extralegal 
property rule, as explained in section 4.2 above. However, an agreement 
was not possible in any of the mentioned mining projects. Here the bias-
es explained in Section III take special importance, making the transfer 
of rights over the environmental asset sticky.   
Thus, Section 5.2 will deal with the initial stand of the problem, 
explaining why the rural communities are entitled to the environmental 
asset and proposing a property rule instead of a liability rule to protect 
such rights. Section 5.3 will discuss the second level of analysis, explain-
ing why even when a property rule exists, legal or extralegal, the mining 
projects will not always be achieved. As a result of installing a property 
rule, the urban citizens will internalize all the costs of their activities, 
making mining more expensive than it has been historically in Peru. The 
urban citizens will pay the real cost of mining. Since mining becomes 
more expensive, only the skilled mining endeavors would go through, 
possibly shrinking the mining business. In section 5.4 we will analyze 
this last scenario together with what was mentioned in Section II: the 
case of Peru, Spain and the resource curse.  
B. Redesigning the System: Property Rule as a Proposed Solution 
If we were able to reorder our system to solve the situations 
mentioned above, who should own the environmental asset? Should the 
mining company own the right to affect the environmental asset, or 
should the villagers own the right to authorize or veto the mining pro-
jects, which may affect the environmental asset? This dilemma is similar 
to the typical example of the industry that comes into town to operate 
used to explain the Coase theorem.153  
A company comes to a town and is going to pollute the air, stain-
ing the white cloths that the citizens hang outside their houses to dry. The 
problem has two possible solutions: either all the citizens buy dryer ma-
chines, adding a total value of $1,000, or the company buys an air filter, 
adding a total amount of $600. The efficient solution is to install the air 
filter; however, this would depend on who has the right. If the citizens 
have the right of not being polluted, then the company is going to have to 
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bear the cost. If the company has the right to pollute, then the citizens are 
going to have to bear the cost. In each case, whoever does not own the 
right is going to approach the other party to bargain for the right, or bear 
the cost directly (buy the dryers in the case of the citizens, and buy the 
air filter in the case of the company). 
What Coase says is that in the absence of transaction costs, it 
would not matter who has the right.154 However, in this case, as in Tambo 
Grande, Conga and Tía María, you do have considerable transactional 
costs, and you have an endowment effect on the side of the citizens be-
cause they had been enjoying the unpolluted environment from time im-
memorial.  
If the entitlement is assigned to the company, then all the villag-
ers would have to agree between them on the solution. Because they do 
not have the right in this scenario, and the efficient solution is to buy the 
air filter for $600, the citizens would have to collect such amount and 
buy it for the company. If the transaction costs of collecting such amount 
exceed the $1,000 that it would cost to install the dryers (which is the 
most likely case), then the citizens will just directly buy the dryers. 
If the entitlement is assigned to the citizens, the company will 
individually decide either to buy the dryers for $1,000 or to install the air 
filter for $600 because the company will not have to negotiate with any-
one to identify the most efficient solution. And because they are the pol-
luters, they should know more about pollution, and the air filter will be 
installed. The company will be the cheapest cost avoider, and the best 
decision maker for finding the most efficient way of limiting pollution.155  
Thus, according to the Coase theorem, the citizens should have 
the right of not being polluted. Considering high transaction costs, this 
initial assignment of entitlement will dispose the system to adopt an effi-
cient solution. The same happens with the mining conflict discussed 
herein. The rural communities shall be entitled to the environmental asset 
because this will lead the mining company to adopt the most efficient 
solution.156 The mining companies would be in the best position to de-
cide which is the most efficient way of treating the environmental asset. 
As explained in Section IV and 5.1, rural communities today are 
legally entitled to the environmental asset. This will concur with the ideal 
set of the environmental asset. However, the protection rule of this enti-
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tlement is a consultation right and a liability rule instead of a veto right 
and a property rule. Under this structure, the mining company does not 
need to bargain for the environmental asset with the rural community, 
but they can affect the environmental asset and then compensate. In other 
words, even if the rural communities believe that their environmental 
asset will be damaged (as explained in Section 3.2), the black letter law 
establishes as a general rule that they have to wait until the damage oc-
curs before claiming compensation through a liability rule. 
Why use a liability rule instead of a property rule? What would 
be the ideal protection rule in this case? The classic answer is that if the 
villagers are too numerous, the transaction costs become unbearable for 
the mining company.157 For this reason, the liability rule applies in cases 
such as car accidents or general environmental disasters, because the car 
driver or the polluter does not know who might be damaged in the future. 
If we apply a property rule in these cases, driving or implementing an 
industrial activity would be impossible. The potential injurer should con-
tract everyone who could potentially be injured before performing the 
activity. Imagine having to sign a contract with all the potential pedestri-
ans or people breathing polluted air in order to obtain your driver’s li-
cense. This is impossible. 
However, this case is distinct from the case of the car driver or 
from a typical environmental disaster. When a mining company comes to 
perform a specific project, we are able to easily identify who may be af-
fected by the project. All the people that live in the counties where the 
mining project will be placed are potentially injured. They are identifia-
ble so that today they ought to be questioned for their opinion according 
to their consultation right.  
If the injured in the mining conflict are identifiable before the 
damage is preformed, the transaction costs are lower than the typical ex-
amples used to endorse a liability rule. Therefore, a property rule shall be 
considered. Most of the time a liability rule does not meet the individual 
value of the parties. Because the injurer has already affected the injured, 
the system gives an objective value through the courts -- even if in a 
normal situation both parties would never reach an agreement.  The risk 
of the liability rule is that the system may lose efficiency because the 
injurer who valued the good less than the injured acquires it through the 
liability rule without permission. Thus, when possible, as in our case, the 
property rule may prevail.158 
Nonetheless, the establishment of a “grey” right of the rural 
communities through a property rule would not be enough to protect the 
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system as a whole. We may fall in what is known as a tragedy of the an-
ticommons.159 Because each individual would have the right to dispose 
of the environmental asset, one of them could block the transaction. The 
tragedy of the anticommons may cause the resources to be underused.160 
A remedy against a tragedy of anticommons is needed, and this 
is democracy. Representatives of the counties, the central government 
and mining company should negotiate a structured proposal of agree-
ment. Then, the villagers of the counties where the project will be exe-
cuted should vote to decide if the mining project should or should not be 
executed. Some of the people in the rural communities will vote in favor 
and others will vote against, as in any vote with more than one option. 
But the majority will decide the future of the town.  
The participation of the central government will be crucial, and 
its efficiency in the process is needed to guarantee success. Most of the 
time, the rural communities are not familiar with the complexities of im-
plementing a mining project and lack sophisticated and technical 
knowledge needed to make efficient decisions. As explained above, for 
this reason the rural communities are entitled with the environmental 
asset because the mining company is the best decision maker and will be 
in a better position to choose the best course of action. 
As in the Nélida case explained in the introduction, the rural 
communities may be in the middle of a cross fire between opposing in-
terests. The mining company wants the mineral, the environmental asso-
ciations want preservation, the government wants the tax the mining 
company will pay, and the media wants news. The rural communities 
want to make a decision that maximizes the benefits to them. If they are 
not correctly and independently advised, they will end in a situation simi-
lar to the Native Americans in the British colonies and sell their land for 
nothing.161  
The government should create a special independent commission 
for these cases, including recognized professionals, which will help in 
the structure and negotiation of the proposal that would be then voted on 
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land did for more than 3 months (they would have to buy food on the market with the money). We 
tried to challenge the agreement arguing hardship, but internal conflicts in the community did not 
allow us to make it to court. However, it would be very improbable that the courts would cancel the 
contract.  
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by the rural community. Why the government? Because the government 
is bound to protect and serve its people.  
Assigning a veto right and a property rule to protect the envi-
ronmental asset of the rural communities will not only create an efficient 
result in terms of the system and the rural communities, but also a result 
that benefits the mining companies. In Tambo Grande, Conga and Tia 
Maria, the mining companies invested significant funds ($60 million, 
$1.5 billion, and $348 million respectively). After the mining projects 
were cancelled or suspended due to the strikes of the rural communities, 
that capital became a waste. Because the investment of the mining com-
panies in these cases is a sunk cost, they may show a tendency to over-
pursue the execution of the project, as the psychological effect of a sunk 
cost has been explained in section 3.3 above. 
If the consultation process would be a veto right instead, protect-
ing the environmental asset with a property rule, then the mining compa-
nies would know that they are investing in a safe project after the ap-
proval is given. The current consultation process does not offer these 
assurances.  
Today, the consultation process does not work well because it 
does not matter at the end of the day. The communities do not have a real 
shield to protect themselves in case they do not want to sell their goods. 
Because of this, their participation in the consultation processes is usual-
ly low, and down the road we encounter the social strikes against the pro-
ject. If the consultation process could be an authorization process instead, 
the villagers would not have anything to claim because they would have 
made a decision suitable to their interests in advance.  
Through clear entitlements over the environmental asset, we will 
have an intense and productive democratic bargaining process instead of 
having a harsh and violent war. Also, because the rural communities will 
have the right to veto the mining project, the mining company will have 
to convince the villagers with social projects that will protect the rural 
community’s activities while the mining company is operating.  
C. Mitigating Party Bias? Revising the Concept of Value 
Even with a property rule, however, mining projects may be 
blocked. In Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María, the rural communities 
managed to push for a recognized extralegal entitlement over the envi-
ronmental asset. Negotiating tables were set, but none of the projects 
made it through. The problem wasn’t any opportunistic blocking due to a 
tragedy of the anticommons because the right was in fact recognized due 
to the action of the majority of villagers against the mine. As mentioned 
before, it is the case that in Tambo Grande a non-binding referendum 
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was put in place, and the community rejected the project with 93 percent 
of the votes.  
All the existing biases in both parties arose on the negotiation ta-
ble and with them also arose the transaction costs.162 The biases related 
to judgment errors (heuristic representativeness and heuristic availabil-
ity) are easier to solve than the biases related to decision making. In the 
former, the rural communities and the urban citizens are reacting with 
their “Homer Simpson” part of the brain, instead of their “Rene Des-
cartes.” In the case of the heuristic representativeness of the urban citi-
zens (tendency to consider the negative attitude of the rural communities 
towards mining projects as irrational), knowledge of cases such as Ancon 
and Colan may help them to sympathize with the rural communities. In 
the case of the heuristic representativeness of rural communities (with 
the tendency to distrust the offers made by the urban citizens related to 
mining projects), knowledge of successful mining projects may reconcile 
the rural communities with urban citizens. In the case of the heuristic 
availability of the rural communities (with the tendency to consider that a 
mining project may damage their environmental asset), statistics about 
the accidents the villagers fear in former mining projects may overcome 
the bias. 
The judgment errors rely on lack of information and precon-
ceived ideas, whilst the decision-making biases may be informed and 
aware decisions. Urban citizens and rural communities may consciously 
adhere to the status quo because they like it. Urban citizens may like 
mining, and rural communities may like agriculture. When we bring the 
status quo bias to the bargaining between the parties, rural communities 
experience the endowment effect as possessors of the environmental as-
set.163 The valuation of the rural communities of the environmental asset 
is not properly irrational, but it is based in a rationality that identifies 
efficiency not only as monetary gain.  
In fact, the endowment effect made the environmental compo-
nent “sticky” in a potential agreement by raising the price, but as said by 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, “This is not to say that Pareto-optimal 
trades will not take place. Rather, there are fewer mutually advantageous 
exchanges possible, and so the volume of trade is lower than it otherwise 
would be.”164  
                                                
162 See Korobkin, supra note 119, at 327-328 (for further comments on transactional costs in 
transferring rights to pollute). 
163 The rural communities that we are referring herein haven’t been directly impacted by min-
ing before. The rural communities that had, as the ones in Cerro de Pasco, do not have any new 
decision to make with regards to the beginning of a project, because the mining is already in execu-
tion, for good or for bad. We are referring to the rural communities that have to decide for a new 
project to be started close to their towns. For this reason the status quo of the urban citizens and the 
rural communities is different, as explained in section 3.3. 
164 Kahneman, supra note 87, at 1344. 
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Under this setting we will have fewer transactions because 
through clearing the grey entitlements, urban citizens will interiorize the 
positive externality they have had for centuries. They will have to recog-
nize the right of the rural communities to decide about their environmen-
tal asset. In other words, the communities would finally have the right to 
determine their future. 
What if the negotiation process ends with a veto of the mining 
project, as happened in Tambo Grande, Conga and Tia Maria, or as it 
could happen under the new structure mentioned in Section 5.2? We 
would be in a better situation. First, because all the fuzziness would be 
locked into democratic boundaries, no violence would take place. In-
stead, the urban citizens (especially the mining companies and the gov-
ernment) would have all the incentives to convince the communities that 
the project will benefit them. Second, with the current “obscuring” enti-
tlements structure, we reach the same result, but at the cost of spilling 
blood and wasting resources. Third, if no deal takes place, this would 
mean that the villagers valued the environmental asset more than the ur-
ban citizens. 
The Coase theorem considers that people who value a deter-
mined good the most should own it in order to generate efficiency in the 
system.165 That is correct, but what is value, and who values the envi-
ronmental asset the most? 
Money is used as an abstraction of value, but it is not value it-
self. The complexity of identifying the value of any good, especially the 
environmental asset, is that we would have a subjective and independent 
analysis for each individual. For a normal urban citizen, the lakes of 
Conga won’t have much value. They do not know how to mine or to 
plant different crops, so the value they get from the lakes is just the en-
joyment of seeing them. For an urban citizen that represents a mining 
company, the lakes’ value would include what they could make with the 
gold that lays underneath them. For a villager, the lakes’ value would 
include their livelihood because they use the water in the lakes for human 
consumption and agriculture.  
Most of the time value has been seen as either the availability to 
pay (how much money would I pay for the environmental asset) or the 
potential productivity of a determined economic activity (how much 
money my usage of the environmental asset will produce).166 Using both 
concepts of value, a mining company will always value the environmen-
tal asset more than a rural villager. The mining business has more money 
                                                
165 Coase, supra note 86, at 40-42; Posner, supra note 85, at 29; Calabresi, supra note 9, at 
1118. 
166 Id. 
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available then the villagers, and it will produce more money than the vil-
lagers’ business. This concept of value is limited, however.    
Coase uses potential productivity of an activity to define value, 
but he also explains, “it is, of course, desirable that the choice between 
different social arrangements for the solution of economic problems 
should be carried out in broader terms than this [value based on produc-
tion] and that the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life 
should be taken into account.” The problem for Coase and many econo-
mists is how to define how much an individual will value a good and the 
answer, I believe, is in the agreement of the parties itself. 167 Value is the 
subjective perspective that an individual will have towards a particular 
good, measuring how much utility the good will give to the individual. In 
other words, how much happiness a determined good grants a person. If 
the urban citizens do not convince rural communities to sell their lands or 
the environmental asset, then subjectively, the rural communities valued 
their goods more than the urban citizens. The endowment effect (as a gap 
between selling and buying price when the individual has the good in her 
endowment) does not void the Coase Theorem, but clarifies the concept 
of value. How can we know who values the good more? If the transac-
tion goes through, then the person who acquires the right is the one who 
values it more. All the complexity of internal and subjective apprecia-
tions of value is summarized in the closing of the agreement, which is 
found in all the terms and consideration contained therein. 
It would be absurd to consider that because the rural villagers 
would pay less money for acquiring the environmental asset than for 
what they would ask to sell it the villagers are irrational (this is the en-
dowment effect at play). Of course, the villagers would pay less money 
because they have less money available or no money at all. If the mining 
company and the rural villagers lived in a world of limitless founts of 
money and entered an auction to acquire the environmental asset, then 
we could use the price that each one offers as an exact representation of 
value. Or, if the rural community is endowed with the environmental 
component and the mining company wants to acquire it, the price and 
conditions under which the villagers accept would be an exact represen-
tation of value and of who values the goods more.  
If we conclude that value is not equal to availability of money, or 
to potential production, but equal to the utility an individual will experi-
ence out of a particular good, then a villager could value the environmen-
tal component more than the mining company. If the mining project is 
not accepted by the rural community, then that would be efficient for the 
system, because the good would be owned by whomever values it more. 
                                                
167 Coase, supra note 86, at 43. 
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Tambo Grande, Conga and Tía María, are great examples of this. Who 
values the environmental asset more? The urban citizens that were dis-
posed to pay considerable amounts of money for it, or the rural commu-
nities that did not have any money but put their lives on the frontline to 
protect what historically has been theirs? 
Efficiency in a system is not mountains of gold and silver but of 
added utility to the inhabitants. If a rural community wants to stay as a 
basic subsistence economy, why should the system force them to change 
their way of living? They have the right to choose, and thus, urban citi-
zens must try their best so that mining is chosen. The claims in many of 
these cases of clashes between rural communities and urban citizens are 
not because the projects will exist or not, but because the villagers are 
not receiving something convincing in exchange. As commented by Pro-
fessor Carol Rose: 
 
There is a bit of a minor key that sounds through these 
laments [of the rural communities], however: Brown lets 
the reader know that indigenous groups are not always 
quite as interested in keeping secrets as they are in mak-
ing sure that they themselves get the revenue if the cat 
gets out of the bag. The Hopi are mad at the Navajo for 
making kachina dolls because the Navajo dolls, they say, 
are a ripoff of a Hopi art form—and besides that, they 
also crowd out the Hopi’s own market for the dolls. 
Meanwhile, indigenous groups in Latin America seem to 
be quite ready to give away the secrets of their cultivars 
and medicinal plants, if giving them up means that 
pharmaceutical companies will pay them for their local 
knowledge. Similarly, the Zia in New Mexico may not 
like the sun symbol showing up all over the place, but 
they have worked out a trademark deal that allows them 
to license its use to interested parties, and presumably 
they could charge if they wished.168 
D. Less Mining? Remembering the Resource Curse in History 
A deal and reconciliation between the parties seems possible, but 
urban citizens must pay a price that fulfills the rural communities’ sub-
jective expectations. Mining may be diminished if urban citizens do not 
convince rural communities, but as explained in Section II, that may not 
be bad after all, as it would assist in breaking the resource curse. 
                                                
168 Rose, supra note 3, at 997. 
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According to many authors169, countries that are rich in natural 
resources may present a slower level of growth than countries that are 
not...The combination of cognitive, social and political elements creates 
a path of dependency to extractive economies in such countries. Latin 
American mining economies are a great example of this and were used 
by Auty in his book “Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: 
The Resource Curse Thesis” to define the concept of the resource curse. 
Examining economic data from the 20th and 21st century, Auty, 
and the different authors that dealt with the resource curse, ran regres-
sions to identify the impact that finding abundant sources of natural re-
sources has over the development of a determined country. However, we 
can see that Peru and Spain are vividly examples of this over centuries.  
After the discovery of Peru and Mexico in the 1500’s, Spain’s 
political and economic power decayed.170 After being one of the most 
powerful Empires of Europe, by the mid seventeenth century they were 
almost in bankruptcy.171 What was the cause? The implementation of an 
extractive economy.172 The Spanish Empire started fulfilling all of its 
needs by acquiring goods from foreign powers, extracting gold and silver 
just to spend it in other empires. This created dependency.  
Kaneman traces the line of dependency until Franco’s regime as 
follows, “The perennial problem of an unfavorable balance of payments 
caused by under productivity, for example, was in the mind of Rodrigo 
de Lujan in 1516, Cortes’ deputy in 1548, of Luis Ortiz in 1558, of 
Floridablanca 1788, of Franco's ministers in the 1960s. Apparent growth 
was a cosmetic over the country's basic industrial weakness.”173 
To these accounts we can add the terrible Spanish economic cri-
ses of 2008, which persists until today for many. The over-investment in 
public infrastructures by the government created apparent growth that 
was only “cosmetic over the country’s basic industrial weakness.” Even 
after centuries, and now having a modern legal system, the effects of the 
accidental discovery of Peru and Mexico may still remain in the Spanish 
economy. 
The same can be said about Peru. After hundreds of years of his-
tory, we have not managed to obtain sustainable industrialization. How-
ever, the defenses in favor of mining remain, mining is the first step to 
later diversify the economy. El Comercio said it in favor of Conga in 
                                                
169 Auty, supra note 65, at 297-322; Sachs, supra note 65, at 827-838, Kirk Hamlton, From 
Curse to Blessing, WORLD BANK ANNUAL REV. 24-27 (2006). 
170 See Henry Kaneman, The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth, 81 PAST & PRESENT 28 
(1978); Earl Hamilton, The Decline of Spain, 8 ECON. HIST. REV. 169 (1938); John Elliot, The De-
cline of Spain, 20 PAST & PRSENT 73 (1961); Jonathan Israel, The Decline of Spain: A Historical 
Myth, 91 PAST & PRESENT 178 (1981). 
171 Elliot, supra note 170, at 56. 
172 Id. at 62. 
173 Henry Kaneman, A Rejoinder, 91 PAST & PRESENT 185 (1981). 
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2012,174 and a group of elite citizens in Arequipa said it too in 1792.175 
Today politicians still clamor for industrialization.  
It seems that the resource curse may be more old and pervasive 
than expected. What happens then if under the structure proposed in Sec-
tion 5.2 the mining business gets reduced? Many economies agree that 
this may be an opportunity to break the resource curse and foster pros-
perity. Basing the economy on the creation of value and trade, the institu-
tions would shift, discarding a top-down regime, and adopting a bottom-
up one.     
CONCLUSION 
Tambo Grande, Conga, and Tía María, looked promising as pro-
jects. The urban citizens, including the government, supported the three 
cases at the time. None of these projects were ever executed; all of them 
ran up against the de facto refusal of rural communities. Urban citizens 
clashed against rural communities, legal or formal entitlements clashed 
with non-legal or informal entitlements.  
Since the beginning of the colonial history of Peru, mining has 
been the preferred economic activity, creating an extractive economic 
system and a top-down property regime. Today we can see that the re-
sults of such emphasis are limited, to say the least. After almost 500 
years of unauthorized decisions, this system is crashing. A lack of gold 
and silver may occur, but this may also lead to innovative ideas to create 
fountains of renewable and endless wealth. From the ashes of the tradi-
tional top-down property regime, a renewed bottom-up or Lockean prop-
erty regime seems to be rising. 
                                                
174 Editorial, Rompiendo el círculo, EL COMCERCIO (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://elcomercio.pe/politica/opinion/editorial-rompiendo-circulo-noticia-
1460035?ref=flujo_tags_322786&ft=nota_187&e=titulo. 
175 DE LA FUENTE Y LOAYZA AND OTHER CITIZENS FROM AREQUIPA: PROYECTO Y 
ORDENANZAS DE LA SOCIEDAD MINERALOGICA DE AREGUIPA 45 (Lima, 1792) (“No hay duda, que 
se presentan otros varios objetos útiles, y compatibles de una Sociedad económica; pero ocurren 
obstáculos invencibles por ahora, que no permiten estas importantes atenciones. Procúrese primero 
la erección de una Sociedad, o Compañía, que pueda enriquecer el país, y entonces podrán sus hijos, 
y vecinos, pensar con oportunidad en otros beneficios públicos”). 
